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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FREEDOM OF RELIGION-REGULATION OF SOLICITATION
OF CHARITABLE FUNDS BY RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION:-Plaintiff, an incorporated
religious organization, brought action against the City of Los Angeles and others
to enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance which regulates solicitations. Solici-
tations made solely for evangelical missionary or religious purposes are expressly
exempted by the ordinance. Plaintiff engages in religious work and gives aid
to the poor. Some of its activities consist of religious services and free distribution
of religious literature as well as providing food, lodging, clothing and other neces-
saries to those in need. It solicits donations from the public to obtain funds for
its activities. Plaintiff contended that, as applied to it, the ordinance abridged
religious liberty in violation of the Constitutions of the United States and of
the State of California. From a judgment for plaintiff, the defendants appealed.
Held, three justices dissenting, judgment reversed. Gospel Army v. City of Los
Angeles, - Cal. App. (2d) -, 163 P. (2d) 704 (1945).
The court in reaching its decision relied on two grounds: one, that the regu-
lations were reasonable and, therefore, even if the charitable solicitation was
religious, the ordinance was constitutional; two, that the solicitation was not re-
ligious and therefore was not protected by the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom. In order to consider the broader and more important question, whether
the solicitation of funds by the plaintiff is a religious activity within the pro-
tection of the constitutional provisions,1 the unreasonableness of the regulatory
ordinance2 will, for the purposes of this discussion, be assumed.
The constitutionality of statutes or ordinances, prohibiting the solicitation of
contributions for a religious purpose without previously obtaining a permit from
proper authorities, has been challenged in several cases3 on the ground that such
statutes or ordinances interfered with the free exercise of religion guaranteed by
the Constitution.4 In several state court decisions their validity was upheld.5
However, these decisions, in so far as they dealt with the validity of such regu-
lations under the Federal Constitution, were in effect overruled by the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut.6 There a statute
prohibiting the solicitation of contributions for a religious cause without approval
of a designated public official was held unconstitutional because it deprived such
solicitors of their religious freedom. On the question whether religious liberty
1. U. S. CONsT. A.-ND. XIV, § 1. CAL. CONST. Art. 1, § 4.
2. Los Angeles Mun. Code, §§ 44.01 to 44.19.
3. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940); In re Dart, 172 Cal. 47, 155 Pac.
63 (1916); Maplewood v. Albright, 13 N. J. Misc. 46, 176, Atl. 194 (1934); Dziat-
kiewicz v. Maplewood, 115 N. J. L. 37, 178 AtI. 205 (1935); Semansky v. Common
Pleas Ct., 13 N. J. Misc. 589, 180 AtI. 214 (1935); Ex parte White, 56 Okla. Cr. 418,
41 P. (2d) 488 (1935).
4. See note 1 supra.
S. Maplewood v. Albright, 13 N. 21. Misc. 46, 176 At. 194 (1935); Dziatkiewicz v.
Maplewood, 115 N. 2. L. 37, 178 Atl. 205 (1935); Semansky v. Common 'Pleas Ct.,
13 N. 2. Misc. 589, 180 At. 214 (1935); Ex parte White, 56 Okla. Cr. 418, 41 P. (2d)
488 (1935).
6. 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
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is protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 7 the Supreme
Court declared: "The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that Amend-
ment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment. The First
Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment
has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact
such laws."18 The court thus held that under the Fourteenth Amendment religious
liberty is protected against unreasonable interference by the state.9 The court
stated, however, that the state has the power reasonably to regulate even religious
activity for the protection of society. "The 'general regulation, in the public in-
terest, of solicitation, which. . . does not imreasonably obstruct or delay the col-
lection of funds, is not open to any constitutional objection, even though t6e
collection be for a religious purpose."10
Hence it is settled law that the solicitation of contributions for a religious
purpose is protected by the constitutional guarantee of religious liberty. However,
a question arises in the case of solicitation of contributions for charitable purposes
by a religious organization which makes such a solicitation a part of its religious
program. Is the work of charity by a religious organization considered a religious
activity and as such protected by the guarantee of religious liberty? In the
instant case the court was faced with this problem and was sharply divided in
its conclusions. No question of interpretation of the statute was involved since
both the majority and minority opinions agreed that the ordinance specifically
differentiated between solicitations for the support of the religious organization
itself and those made for charitable work, exempting the first but not the second.
The plaintiff contended that since the practice of charity and the solicitation
of funds for that purpose are part of its religious duties, the ordinance regulating
the solicitation of charitable contributions 1' cannot apply to plaintiff's solicitations
without abridging its religious liberty. The majority of the court held that the
plaintiff's charitable work was not exclusively a religious activity and that, there-
fore, the legislature could constitutionally regulate such solicitations. The Cantwell
case was distinguished on the ground that there the religious organization solicited
funds not for charity but 'for its own support, while here plaintiff solicits also
for charitable purposes. The majority said: "There is no doubt that plaintiff,
like many religious organizations, regards the practice of charity as a religious
duty. It is not exclusively a religious activity, however; many charitable activities
spring from sources in the everyday life of the community unrelated to religion."'1
In other words the majority reasoned that the essential characteristic of a religious
activity which is protected by the constitutional guarantee is that it be exclusively
religious. Charity is not an exclusively religious activity and hence, according
7. U. S. CoxsT. Aiam. XIV § 1.
8. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940).
9. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943); West Virginia Board of Edu-
cation v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943); Commonwealth v. Palms, 141 Pa. Super.
430, 15 A. (2d) 481 (1940); Ex parte Winnet, 73 Okla. Cr. 33, 121 P. (2d) 312 (1942).
Cf. Rorrscum m, CONsTuruoNA. LAw (1939) 728.
10. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 305 (1940).
11. Los Angeles Mun. Code, § 44.05.
12. Gospel Army v. The City of Los Angeles, - Cal. App. (2d) -, 163 P. (2d) 704,
712 (1945).
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to the majority, is not protected by the right of freedom of religion even when
carried on as a religious duty. The majority argued that because charity reaches
into the secular life of the community, it becomes the concern of the community
and subject to its regulations regardless of its religious motives; therefore, solici-
tations for charity as such may not be especially privileged even when carried
on by a religious organization as part of its religious program. The majority would
sever a charitable activity from other admittedly religious activities, even though
both are carried on as religious duties. It placed the first in the realm of secular
affairs, separating it from its religious initiative, plan and formula.
The minority disagreed with the severance theory of the majority, arguing that
charity is not only motivated by religion but forms an integral part thereof and
that in plaintiff's program charity is a part and parcel, not just an incident, of
its religion, citing the court's prior decision in In re Dart.'3  In that case a
similar situation to the one in the instant case was presented; the question of
the validity of an ordinance arose concerning the solicitation of funds by the
Salvation Army which used part of its funds to extend charitable relief to needy
people. The court there said, as the second ground for its decision,'14 that in so
far as the ordinance prohibited the Salvation Army from soliciting funds without
a permit it was invalid as an unlawful interference with religious freedom. It
reasoned that since this organization made the relief of the destitute an integral
part of its religious life and work, such charity cannot be separated from religion
and is protected by religious freedom,15 observing that the secular aspect of charity
which applies equally to all charities, whether temporal or religious, is distinguish-
able from the religious aspect of charity which applies only to religious charity.
The precise question whether charity conducted as part of a religious practice
is to be protected by the right of freedom of religion has apparently not, except
for these two California cases, been dealt with in our courts, nor apparently
has it been taken up by the text writers. It is submitted that the minority view
in the principal case is the correct one. The majority would appear to be in error
in assuming that the Constitution only protects a religious activity or practice
which is always, and under all circumstances, essentially of a religious nature,
and that an activity which can be carried on by a secular organization for that
reason cannot be considered a religious activity when engaged in by a religious
body. This premise would appear to be unsound. The motive with which an act
is done and the person who performs the act cannot so easily be disregarded.
The speech given by a layman may be distinguished from the sermon preached
by a minister of religion not only in the matter of content but also in the fact
that one may be secular and the other religious, considering the purpose and the
speaker. Take the very act of soliciting funds. Such solicitation may be a re-
13. 172 Cal. 47, 155 Pac, 63 (1916).
14. As the first ground the court said that, even if charity was to be considered
a secular activity, this ordinance was invalid because it unduly restricted the person's
pursuit of happiness. The authority of this case is somewhat weakened by the fact that
the decision is 'two-pronged.'
15. In re Dart, 172 Cal. 47, 55, 155 Pac. 63, 66 (1916), wherein the court, in speak-
ing of the place charity takes in the Jewish and Christian religions, declared: "In both
of these religions, charity is the central word. It is enjoined, not as a good thing, or
as a kindly thing only, but as a fundamental part of the religion itself."
1946]
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ligious activity within the protection of the Constitution16 and yet, depending
upon the purpose of the solicitation and the person soliciting, it may be an un-
protected secular activity. Education is another obvious case in point.17 Un-
doubtedly there are limitations upon activities which may be denominated religious.
A court may not be required to treat a manifestly commercial activity as religious
merely because it is carried on by a religious body for an ostensibly religious
purpose.' 8  No such doubt can exist, however, in the case of the obviously and
traditionally religious act of alms-giving, which historically and theologically con-
stitutes so important a part of the practice ,of religion.' 9 Such charitable activity
has been recognized by the courts in some decisions as an essential function of
a religious organization.
2 0
16. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
17. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925).
18. Church of Redeemer v. Axtell, 41 N. J. L. 117 (1878), wherein it was held that
a statute exempting buildings used for religious purposes does not exempt a parsonage;
Thompson v. West, 59 Neb. 677, 82 N. W. 13 (1900), wherein it was held that trans-
actions in real estate merely as a matter of speculation by a religious corporation were
vtra vires and void, even though the proceeds were used to pay its indebtedness and
for the construction of its building; Board of Foreign Missions of M. E. Church v.
Board of Assessors of City of Yonkers, 244 N. Y. 42, 154 N. E. 816 (1926), wherein
it was held that property of the church hired out to persons unconnected with mis-
sionary undertakings, from which income was received, was not exempt from taxation
as property used exclusively for religious purposes; Skipper v. Davis, (Tex. Civ. App.)
59 S. W. (2d) 454, 457 (1932), wherein the opening of an oil well for extraction of
oil was said to constitute a "commercial purpose" for profit and not a "religious pur-
pose" with regard to the use of land conveyed for religious purposes only.
19. See in re Durbrow's Estate, 245 N. Y. 469, 157 N. E. 747 (1927), wherein a
residuary clause of a will directing the executor to distribute the residue of the estate
"where he shall consider it most effective in the advancement of Christ's Kingdom on
earth" was held valid as creating a definite trust for religious and charitable uses. In
interpreting the purpose of this bequest to be the advancement of the cause of the
Christian religion, the court at p. 748 said: "Its cause is advanced in divers manners,
conspicuously through the work of religious associations and educational and charitable
institutions of a religious character. . . It is identified not only with the dissemination
of Christian doctrine but also with the teaching of the young and the care of the sick
under such auspices. Charity and education have thus ever been the handmaids of
religion. By the terminology of Evangelical Christianity, the bequest is one in aid of
Christian work in its broadest sense; to carry Christ's message throughout the world;
to care for the sick; and to bring up the young under religious teaching; to promote
the principles and practices of the Christian religion. For these purposes, the church
seeks and obtains the eleemosynary contributions of the laity. ..
20. Succession of Auch, 3 So. 227 (La. 1887), wherein it was held that a corporation
organized solely for religious, and not for charitable, purposes is entitled to take a
charitable bequest. The court there said that charity is not foreign to the purpose of
Christian religious organizations, but on the contrary, is an essential function in their
economy; Boardman v. Hitchcock, 136 App. Div. 253, 120 N. Y. Supp. 1039 (4th
Dep't 1910) aff'd 202 N. Y. 622, 96 N. E. 1110 (1911), wherein it was held that the
maintenance of a home "for the returned, needy and worthy missionaries" was not
beyond the domain of a religious corporation.
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In addition, the conclusion reached by the majority is unpractical and results
in an anomaly. A religious organization will be allowed to use its own funds
for charitable purposes without hindrance but if it is to solicit directly for charity
it will be bound by the regulations of the ordinance. Thus, all that a religious
organization need do to avoid the regulations is to solicit only for its own support
and then distribute the funds as it may choose.
21
CRIMINAL LAW-PERJURY-NECESSITY FOR JURISDICTION OF TRIBUNAL BEFORE
WHICH COMMITTED.-Petitioner and others were indicted by the Tulsa County
Grand Jury for the crime of conspiracy to defraud the State of Oklahoma. The
indictment was quashed upon it being shown that the crime had not been com-
mitted in Tulsa County and that the prosecution for the crime was barred by
the Statute of Limitations. The petitioner was then indicted by the Tulsa County
Grand Jury for allegedly perjurious answers made during his testimony before
the grand jury in the prior hearing. The petitioner thereupon requested this court
to issue a writ prohibiting the district court from prosecuting the, indictment for
perjury. Held, one judge dissenting, that the writ be granted. Bennett v. District
Court of Tulsa County, - Okla. Cr. -, 162 P. (2d) 561 (1945).
In Rex v. Aylektt,' Lord Mansfield succinctly stated the common law requisites
for the crime of perjury as follows: "In the case of perjury, I take the circum-
stances requisite to be these: the oath must be taken in a judicial proceeding
before a competent jurisdiction and it must be material to the question depending".
The requirement of "competent jurisdiction" however, found no place in the English
Perjury Act enacted in 1911.2 Thus in England it would appear that perjury will
lie even where the court had no jurisdiction of the action in which the statement
was made.3 In the United States however, statutory definitions of perjury com-
mitted in judicial proceedings 4 have been interpreted as including the common
law requisite of "competent jurisdiction".5 On the other hand, there have been
statements in some judicial opinions which fail to. include in their requirements
for perjury the necessity for the competent jurisdiction of the court or body
21. In fact, in the instant case the record disclosed no segregation of solicited funds
an the books of the plaintiff as being for a religious or for a charitable purpose. See
163 P. (2d) 704. 729 (dissenting opinion).
1. 1 T. R. 63, 69, 99 Eng. Rep. 973, 976 (K. B. 1785).
2. Perjury Act, 1911 1 & 2 Geo. V c. 6. See, 9 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND (2d ed.
1933) 343, n. (I).
3. Perjury Act, Supra note 2 § 1 (2); ARCHBOLD, PLEADING, EVIDENCE, & PRACTICE
(28th ed. 1931) 1219.
4. For instance, ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 5159; CAL. PENAL CODE (1941)
§ 118; GA. CODE (1933) § 26-4001; ILL. REV. STAT. (1939) c. 38 § 473: 2 N.J.S.A.
§ 2:157-1: N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1620; 21 OErLA. STAT. (1941) § 491.
5. Thomas v. State, 13 Ala. App. 421, 69 So. 413 (1915); People v. Howard, 111
Cal. 655, 44 Pac. 342 (1896); Renew v. State, 79 Ga. 162, 4 S. E. 19 (1887); Pankey
v. People, 2 Ill. 80 (1833); State v. Lawson, 98 N.J.L. 593, 121 AtI. 705 (1923);
People v. Goodheim, 188 App. Div. 148, 176 N. Y. Supp. 468 (1st Dep't 1919); Morford
v. Territory, 10 Okla. 741, 63 Pac. 958 (1901).
1946]
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before which the false testimony is given.6 It should also be pointed out that
modem statutory definitions of perjury often include within the scope of the
statutory crime false swearing in proceedings which are non-judicial in nature or
wherever a statement under oath is required by law. 7 For purposes of discussing
the question presented in the principal case, consideration will be restricted to the
requirement of competent jurisdiction where perjury is charged to have been com-
mitted in a judicial proceeding.8
In the instant case, the question of jurisdiqtion of the grand jury in the hearing
in which the false testimony was given is the pivot upon which the decision turns.
Although allusion is made in the majority opinion to the non-materiality of the
allegedly perjurious answers, the majority's decision is primarily based on the
proposition that notwithstanding the materiality or lack of materiality of the tes-
timony, the crime of perjury could not be sustained if the evidence later showed
that the venue for the crime being investigated laid in another county or that
the prosecution was barred by the Statute of Limitations. Concededly, since the
conspiracy was committed in another county9 and the prosecution was barred by
the Statute of Limitations,' o a valid jurisdictional impediment to the action of
6. For example, in People v. Kresel, 147 Misc. 241, 242, 264 N. Y. Supp. 464, 466
(Sup. Ct. 1932) the court said: "To establish the crime of perjury, it is necessary that
the people prove three elements of the crime: The false swearing, the corrupt or willful
intent in such false swearing and, thirdly, that the matter falsely and willfully sworn
to was material to the issue in the trial." However, it should be noted that, since this
case did not involve any question of jurisdiction, the failure to include the requirement
of competent jurisdiction may lack significance.
7. Thus the N. Y. PEN. LAw, § 1620 defines perjury to include false swearing "... in,
or in connection with, any action or special proceeding, hearing, or inquiry, or on any
occasion in which an oath is required by law or is necessary for the prosecution or
defense of a private right or for the ends of public justice or may lawfully be
administered. . ." So that the crime of perjury has been construed to include a false
swearing to an application for a pistol permit, People v. Joseph, 173 Misc. 410, 17
N. Y. S. (2d) 943 (Sup. Ct. 1940); or to an application for a marriage license, People
v. Lecesse, 32 Cr. R. 20, 148 N. Y. Supp. 929 (City Ct. 1914); or to a report made
to the superintendent of banks as required by law, People v. Vail, 57 How. Pr. 81
(N. Y. 1879).
8. A grand jury, being a constituent part or branch of the court, is a judicial body
and its members are officers of the court. Irwin v. Murphy, 129 Cal. App. 713, 19 P.
(2d) 292 (1933) ; State ex rel Hall v. Burney, 229 Mo. App. 759, 84 S. W. (2d) 659 (1935);
State v. Crowder, 193 N. C. 130, 136 S. E. 337 (1927).
9. "The grand jury are sworn to inquire, only for the body of the county, pro
corpore comitatus; and therefore they cannot regularly inquire of a fact done out of
that county for which they, are sworn, unless particularly enabled by act of parliament."
4 BL. Comm. *303. Bowie v. State, 185 Ark. 834, 49 S. W. (2d) 1049 (1932); State v.
Oliver, 186 N. C. 329, 119 S. E. 370 (1923); In re Dauphin County Grand Jury, 332
Pa. 289, 2 A. (2d) 783 (1938).
10. Unlike statutes of .imitations in civil cases which are statutes of repose and
bar the remedy only, the statute of limitations in a criminal case creates a bar to
prosecution and the time within which an offense is committed becomes a jurisdictional
fact which the state must allege and prove. People v. Ross, 325 "11. 417, 156 N. E.
303 (1927); People v. Hines, 284 N. Y. 93, 29 N. E. (2d) 483 (1940) ; People ex rel
[VoL 15
RECENT DECISIONS
the grand jury was raised. Thus the precise question presented by the instant
case is this: does such failure of jurisdiction prevent the commission of the crime
of perjury?
It is well settled that where there is absolute want of jurisdiction to take cog-
nizance of a matter ab initio, false testimony in said proceeding will not constitute
perjury.1 ' Thus, where there was no statute making it a criminal offense for a
constable to take illegal fees,12 or where there was no statutory authority for the
proceeding in which the oath was taken,' 3 false testimony in such proceedings
did not constitute perjury. In the same vein it has been held that where the
special tribunal before which the testimony was taken was illegally appointed and
without authority to act 14 or where the proceedings were held before a justice
of the peace outside of the district for which he was elected,15 perjury could not
be sustained.
The aforementioned general rule however has been qualified and restricted so
that perjury may be committed on a trial under an indictment which is after-
wards held to be insufficient,16 and false testimony given in a case where the
record indicated jurisdiction was none the less perjury because facts later ap-
peared to defeat jurisdiction.' 7 Following this train of thought, it was held in
a federal case that false testimony in an injunction suit where the bill alleged
diversity of citizenship thus giving the federal court jurisdiction, constituted perjury
even though jurisdiction was later defeated by evidence showing an identity of
interest between the plaintiff and one of the defendants.18 The principle of law
induced from these cases which qualify and limit the general rule is that while
a court may eventually not have jurisdiction to pronounce an effective judgment
because facts to defeat jurisdiction later appear nevertheless false testimony given
during such a hearing should be perjury.
If the court or other body before which the false testimony is given has at
Reibman v. Warden of County jail at Salem, 242 App. Div. 282, 275 N. Y. Supp. 59
(3d Dep't 1934).
11. 2 WHARTON, CipmnrNx. LAW (1.2th ed. 1932) § 1538. But see State v. Mandehr,
168 Minn. 139, 209 N. W. 750 (1926) (perjury conviction sustained where perjurious
testimony was given in trial for violation of city ordinance previously annulled by
state statute).
12. Pankey v. People, 2 I1. 80 (1833).
13. State v. Gates, 107 N. C. 832, 12 S. E. 319 (1890) (false testimony in the trial
of a motion to tax costs against the prosecutor where there was no statutory authority
for the taxing of costs in such cases was not perjury).
14. Commonwealth v. Hillenbrand, 96 Ky. 407, 29 S. W. 287 (1895) (false testimony
alleged to have been committed before a committee appointed by a legislative body
to investigate charges of bribery held not to constitute perjury since the legislative
body had no authority to appoint such a committee).
15. Berry v. State, 10 Old. Cr. 308, 136 Pac. 195 (1913).
16. State v. Rowell, 72 Vt. 28, 47 AtL, 111 (1899). It should be pointed out however,
that where an indictment is insufficient, merely in form, as in the case cited, the court
has jurisdiction. See Note (1945) 14 FoRDHAm L. Rzv. 101, 103.
17. People v. Rogers, 348 Ill. 322, 180 N. E. 856 (1932). (Although a decree of
divorce granted on the basis of false testimony as to residence was void, the one giving
the false testimony was guilty of perjury).
18. West v. United States. 258 Fed. 413 (C. C. A. 6th, 1919).
1946]
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least jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction to the extent of taking evidence
for that purpose, it would seem that false testimony given while the hearing body
possesses prima facie jurisdiction should be punishable as the crime known at
the common law as perjury. Such a case is clearly distinguishable from one where
at the very outset the court or other body patently lacks jurisdiction to proceed
further and take evidence. False testimony is criminal because the judicial process
of the law depends for its effective administration upon some sanction to assure
the truthfulness of the testimony upon which judicial action is predicated. 19 Such
a process would be defeated by false testimony whether or not the court even-
tually is able to render an effective judgment. An example may be apposite-
false testimony by a process server that he made personal service of a summons
on a defendant in a civil case. Could it be successfully argued that such false
testimony given under oath is not perjury because the court finally decided that
there was no personal service and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction? If
however, the complaint disclosed on its face that the court lacked jurisdiction to
grant relief, it would be arguable that no perjury could be committed.
In the instant case the court simply held that since the grand jury did not
have jurisdiction to indict, perjury could not be committed. In order to sustain
its holding, the majority places its reliance on cases which are neither pertinent
nor germane to the issue in question. 20 The dissent's contention that this is merely
a case of the subsequent disclosure of the want of jurisdiction to pronounce an
effective judgment commends itself as the proper approach. The crime of con-
spiracy to defraud the state was a felony and within the general criminal juris-
diction of a District Court of Oklahoma. 2' The grand jury was duly empaneled
by that court to investigate and determine whether or not said crime had been
committed in Tulsa County, and if so, to indict. The failure of jurisdiction was
evident only after the facts had been ascertained and there had finally been a
definite adjudication to that effect by the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals. 22
It is submitted that to allow this adjudication retroactively to afford a defense
to one who had given false testimony in such an investigation, finds little support
in precedent or logic and is contrary to sound public policy.
19. In order to combat falsifications and vindicate their authority, courts properly
have held perjury to be the subject matter of a punishment for contempt. Ex Parte
Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378 (1919); Berkson v. People, 154 Ill. 81, 39 N. E. 1079 (1894);
In re Rosenberg, 90 Wis. 581, 63 N. W. 1065 (1895). For a discussion of the power of
the courts to punish perjury as contempt, see Comment (1933) 21 CALIF. L. Rxv. 582.
20. Among others, State v. Mitchell, State Bank Examiner et al., 202 N. C. 439,
163 S. E. 581 (1932) in which it was held that a grand jury in one county could not
indict a defendant for a crime committed in another county and Oklahoma Tax Com-
mission v. Clendinning, 193 Oki. 271, 143 P. (2d) 143 (1943) which involved an inter-
pretation of the Uniform State Tax Procedure Act and held that a grand jury in one
county could not be concerned with violations of the income tax law by citizens of
another county. Neither of these cases involved the precise question involved in the
principal case, i. e., did the grand jury have jurisdiction to hear the perjured testimony?
21. OxL. CONST. Art. 7 § 10; 20 OKrA. STAT. 1941 § 91.
22. State v. Bennett et al, - Okl. Cr. - 162 P. (2d) 581 (1945).
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DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT TO SELL-REcOVERY OF RETAILER'S NET
PROFIT-GENERAL OR SPECIAL DAmAGEs.-Defendant partnership contracted to sell
quantities of wine to plaintiff's assignor at monthly intervals over a three year
period. Other wines of the type contracted for were not available on the market,
although this fact was apparently unknown to the defendants when the contract
was made. Before deliveries were to commence defendants announced they would
make no deliveries. The buyer elected to treat this announcement as an antici-
patory breach and started this action for damages. From a judgment for the
plaintiff both parties appealed. Held, plaintiff was entitled to recover prospective
net profits which the buyer would have made in the ordinary course of business
had not defendants breached the contract of sale. Bercut v. Park, Benziger and
Co., 150 F. (2d) 731 (C. C. A. 9th, 1945).
The court's opinion does not disclose whether at the time the contract was
made the defendants knew that the buyer would be unable to obtain from other
sources, at the times set for delivery, wines of the type contracted for. Never-
theless the insistence of defendant's counsel that prospective profits are not re-
coverable, unless the seller is proved to have such knowledge, indicates that such
knowledge was lacking. The court's conclusion that, despite such lack of knowl-
edge, the plaintiff should recover the net profits the buyer would have made upon
a resale, constitutes a decision which, while it may be just under the particular
facts of the instant case, appears in view of the authorities, to be at best un-
certain in its statement of the law.
The basis of the court's determination was that the buyer's loss of prospective
net profits was the ordinary damages which flowed from the breach. It is true
that loss of net profits may be the ordinary or usual damages which result
from a breach. In legal parlance such damages are frequently referred to as
"general damages." Yet loss of net profits may also, and frequently do, constitute
so-called "special", "extraordinary" or "consequential" damages. "Ordinary" or
"extraordinary," "general" or "special" are relative terms.' A loss which, under
one set of facts may be considered usual,2 in another set of facts may be con-
sidered unusual.3 In final analysis whether a loss is ordinary (usual) or extra-
1. Kerr S.S. Co., Inc. v. Radio Corporation of Akmerica, 245 N. Y. 284, 288, 157
N. E. 140, 141 (1927), where the court speaking through Cardozo, C. J., said "At
the root of the problem is the distinction between general and special damage as it
has been developed in our law. There is need to keep in mind that the distinction
is not absolute, but relative. To put it in other words, damage which is general in
relation to a, contract of one kind may be classified as special in relation to another."
2. Weston v. Boston & M. R. Co., 190 Mass. 298, 76 N. E. 1059 (1906) wherein
the plaintiff was permitted to recover from a carrier the net profit which would have
been made from a theatrical performance, had the carrier not wrongfully delayed trans-
portation of a stage scenery and other properties of a theatrical company. In Chapman
v. Fargo, 223 N. Y. 32, 39, 119 N. E. 76, 78 (1918), the court pointed out that such
damages would not be deemed special damages but ordinary damages such as were
to be anticipated in view of the facts known to the carrier.
3. Chapman v. Fargo, 223 N. Y. 32, 119 N. E. 76 (1918), wherein a carrier failed
to transport promptly a package of motion picture films marked "Rush" which were
intended for a Christmas showing. The court refused to allow the plaintiff to recover
the profits which would have been realized from an exhibition of the films, since it
was not proved that the carrier knew of all the special circumstances.
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ordinary (unusual) depends upon the facts known to the parties to the contract,
at the time it was made, in respect to the circumstances which would exist, if
the contract were breached. Hadley v. Baxendale4 announced the guiding prin-
ciple so far as damages for breach of a contract are concerned: they are "such
as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally-i.e., accord-
ing to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself--or such as
may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties
at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach."r5 Simply
stated, the recoverable damages are those which are foreseeable.6 The normal
damages which would ordinarily result are Rresumed to have been foreseen;T if
they would ordinarily not result from the breach they are unusual in that sense,
but if they were actually foreseen, or should have been foreseen, such damages
are, in view of such foresight, not extraordinary or unusual but quite normal.
8
The key, therefore, to whether damages are usual and recoverable or unusual and
not recoverable exists, in the last analysis, in the knowledge, or lack of knowledge,
of the special circumstances which the defendant possessed at the time the contract
was made. Knowledge acquired later is immaterial. 9
4. 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
5. Id. at 355, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151.
6. Some courts, especially the federal courts, would require in addition to foresight,
proof of an assumption of liability in respect to any out-of-the-ordinary loss. Globe
Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U. S. 540, 543-544 (1903), wherein Justice
Holmes said: "It is true that, as people when contracting contemplate performance,
not breach, they commonly say little or nothing as to what shall happen in the latter
event, and the common rules have been worked out by common sense, which has
established what the parties probably would have said if they had spoken about the
matter. But a man never can be absolutely certain of performing any contract, when
the time of performance arrives, and, in many cases, he obviously is taking the risk
of an event which is wholly, or to an appreciable extent, beyond his control. The
extent of liability in such cases is likely to be within his contemplation, and, whether
it is or not, should be worked out in terms which it fairly may be presumed he would
have assented to if they had been presented to his mind. . . We have to consider, there-
fore, what the plaintiff would have been entitled to recover in that case, and that
depends on what liability the defendant fairly may be supposed to have assumed con-
sciously, or to have warranted the plaintiff reasonably to suppose that it assumed, when
the contract was made." See Twachtman v. Connelly, 106 F. (2d) 501 (C. C. A. 6th,
1939). Of course the federal courts may not apply the above rule of damages where
the doctrine of Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938) applies. The doctrine
of the federal courts has been criticized, 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, (Rev. ed. 1937) §
1357, and defended, Bauer, Consequential Damages in Contract (1932) 80 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 687.
7. Cory v. Thames Iron Works and Shipbuilding Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 181 (1868);
United States v. Burton Coal Co., 273 U. S. 337 (1927).
8. See note 2 supra.
9. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1937) § 1357, p. 3807; 1 RESTATELrNT,
CONTRACTS (1932) § 330; Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U. S. 540.
545 (1903); Goldston v. Wade, 123 N. Y. Supp. 114, 115 (Sup. Ct. 1910); Hassler v.
Gulf Co., & S. F. Ry. Co., (Tex. Civ. App.) 142 S. W. 629 (1911). One reason why
the plaintiff's damages cannot be increased by knowledge, acquired after the contract
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One special circumstance in particular, upon which the decision in Hadley v.
Baxendale itself turned'0 and which is very often the determining factor in any
transaction involving the principle announced in that landmark of the law, is
knowledge by the breaching party, at the time the contract was made, of the
unavailability to the injured party of substituted performance by someone other
than the wrongdoer.1 ' This requirement is posited upon the interrelated rule
of damages that a party wronged cannot recover damages for consequences of
the wrong which could have been avoided by the injured person with the exercise
of reasonable care.1
2
The above common law principles have been codified in the Uniform Sales Act.
The measures of damages for breach of an executory contract to sell, where the
commodity involved is available in a market, "in the absence of special circum-
stances showing proximate damages of a greater amount, is the difference between
the contract price and the market or current price" at the time and place for
performance; 13 otherwise the measure of damages "is the loss directly and natur-
ally resulting in the ordinary course of events, from the seller's breach of contract."'
4
Where there is an available market for the goods in question, rarely will "the
special circumstances" exist to permit a recovery by a buyer of damages greater
is made, of facts indicating that a larger-than-usual loss may result from the breach,
is that the opportunity to refuse to enter into the contract or to fix a higher price in
view of the greater risk is lost once the contract is entered into and the terms fixed.
To hold the defendant liable for the greater loss where he is later informed of the
facts would seem to be unjust. McCoRascx, DAMAGES (1935) 572. For this reason
the decision in Dreyer Commission Co. v. Fruen Cereal Co., 148 Minn. 443, 182 °N. W.
520 (1921) seems questionable. It is not required, however, that the seller know of
an actual contract of resale. It is sufficient that he understand that the goods are
purchased for eventual resale, as in the ordinary wholesaler-retailer contract. Delafield
v. Armsby, 131 App. Div. 572, 116 N. Y. Supp. 71 (1st Dep't 1909) aff'd, 199 N. Y.
518, 92 N. E. 1083 (1910).
10. The actual decision in Hadley v. Baxendale may be criticized since the court
held as a matter of law that the defendant lacked notice or knowledge of the special
circumstances, whereas, under the facts of the case, it would seem that the jury might
have inferred sufficient notice or knowledge. See Hooks Smelting Co. v. Planters' Com-
press Co., 72 Ark. 275, 79 S. W. 1052 (1904).
11. Czarnikow-Rionda Co. v. Federal Sugar Refining Co., 255 N. Y. 33, 173 N. E.
913 (1930), noted in (1931) 16 CoRw. L. Q. 584; RESTATE.MENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 330,
comment c, pp. 510-511; 1 SEDGWiCK, EIxmENTs OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES (2d ed.
1909) 67.
12. McCoasicK, DAMAGES (1935) pp. 127, 133; 1 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §
336. "Czarnikow is in this dilemma: If the circumstances referred to, or other special cir-
cumstances, debarred Czarnikow from making replacements from the general market,
then Federal is not liable for Czarnikow's special loss since it had no knowledge, when
contracting, of the special circumstances which might give rise to Czarnikow's disability.
On the other hand, if there were no such circumstances and no disability to make
replacement from the general-market, then, under all the authorities, Czarnikow is
entitled to none other than general damages." Czarnlkow-Rionda Co. v. Federal Sugar
Refining Co., 255 N. Y. 33, 48, 173 N. E. 913, 918 (1930).
13. UNmRm SArEs ACT, § 67(3).
14. UNIFoRm SALES ACT, § 67(2).
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in amount than the standardized difference between the contract price and market
price, for, as the parties are presumed to have contemplated, the buyer can supply
himself with the equivalent from the market.
Does it follow, as the court held in the instant case, that, in the absence of a
market, the buyer automatically recovers the net profit he would have made on
a resale? It would seem not. It is true that the Sales Act only speaks of "special
circumstances" in connection with goods having an available market, but it does
not seem to follow that, where the goods have no market, the limitations upon
recovery expressed in Hadley v. Baxendale, cease to apply. In such a case "the
loss directly and naturally resulting in the ordinary course of events from the
seller's breach"' 5 is not necessarily and always the net profit which would have
been made by the buyer on a resale. The Inet resale profit would be such a loss
bad the parties known, when the contract was made, that there would be no
market at the time of delivery.16 Then the loss of net profits would be a con-
templated loss within the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale. But where, as was ap-
parently the fact in the instant case, the parties lacked such knowledge, how
can it be said that the loss of the net resale profit was foreseen as likely damages,
unless it is to be presumed as a matter of law (or as an inference of fact in the
particular case) that such a loss was a contemplated probability? The seller might
urge, as did the defendants in the principal case, that at the time the contract
was made the seller assumed that in case of a breach the buyer would supply
himself from the market and thus minimize his damages.
Such an argument is not merely technical. It may have a practical basis. In
the principal case the sellers were apparently wholesalers and the buyer a retailer.
Even after eliminating the expense incidental to a resale, the spread between
the wholesale price and the retail price-i.e., the net profit-might be very sub-
stantial. 17 In the absence of knowledge that wines of the type contracted for
would, in case of a breach, be unavailable in the market, it would seem to be
an extension of the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale to hold the sellers liable for
such an unusual loss.
It cannot be said that judicial opinion or text-writers support the decision.
The court cites the case of Orester v. Dayton Rubber Mfg. Co.,'8 for the propo-
sition that loss of net profits on a resale "are not special, but are general damages."'19
But, as above pointed out, the adjectives "special" and "general" are relative in
meaning.20 In the cited case the seller was the sole source of the particular
15. Ibid.
16. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1937) § 1347; 1 CLARK, NEW YORK LAW OF
DAMAGES (1925) § 264.
17. In the principal case where the contract was to deliver 60,000 cases of wine
the plaintiff recovered the sum of $72,687.51, representing the difference between the
contract price and the retail price, less expenses of transporting, insuring, warehousing
and selling the wines. In any event recoverable net profits must be such as are normal,
since except where the geller has knowledge of a specific resale at an extraordinary
profit, it must be presumed that the goods were to be resold at a normal profit. Booth
v. Spuyten Duyvil Rolling Mill Co., 60 N. Y. 487 (1875); 1 RESTATEaEENT, CONTRACTS
(1932) § 331, comment b.
18. 228 N. Y. 134, 126 N. E. 510 (1920).
19. 150 F. (2d) 731, 733 (C. C. A. 9th, 1945).
20. See notes 1, 2 and 3 supra. Also see Neverfail Lighter Co. Inc. v. Blum, 201
App. Div. 153, 194 N. Y. Supp. 24 (1st Dep't 1924).
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kind of tiret which it had agreed to deliver to the buyer and must have known
at the time the contract was made that the buyer would be unable to avoid the
loss of his resale profit by acquiring similar tires in the market. The other cases
cited by the court do not appear to be in point.21 The court admits that Williston
supports the position taken by the defendants,22 and there are decisions which
would appear to conflict with the one in the principal case. 23
What undoubtedly in part impelled the court to permit the plaintiff to recover
the net profits on a resale was the apparent injustice of the alternative recovery,
namely, nominal damages. While the rationale of the principle announced in
Hadky v. Baxendale would seem to lead to such result, it strikes one as unjust.
Perhaps the just solution-and, for all that appears, the one which the court in
the principal case actually hit upon-was that the probability that wines of the
type contracted for might be unavailable at the time of delivery was inferentially
within the contemplation of the parties when they made their contract. In this
type of wholesaler-retailer transaction no one could really quarrel if such an
inference of fact were drawn. Nevertheless, in apparently repudiating the prin-
ciple that to recover net resale profits a buyer must prove that a seller knew
or at least foresaw the probability, when contracting, that equivalent goods would
mot later be available to the buyer, the opinion is questionable.
21. It does not appear from the facts in the following cases cited by the court,
Sobelman v. Maier, 203 Cal. 1, 262 Pac. 1087 (1927); West Coast Winery v. Golden
West Wineries, - Cal. App. (2d) -, 158 P. (2d) 623 (1945) ; Roach Bros. & Co. v. Lactein
Food Co., 57 Cal. App. 379, 207 Pac. 419 (1922); Western Industries Co. v. Mason
Malt Whiskey Distilling Co., 56 Cal. App. 355, 205 Pac. 466 (1922) that the seller, at
the time the contract was made, had any knowledge of the probability of substitute
performance. In the other cases cited by the court, Flores v. Basso, 229 Mich. 577,
201 N. W. 875 (1925); Acunto v. Schmidt-Dauber Co., Inc., 207 App. Div. 411, 202
N. Y. Supp. 1 (1923); Black Diamond Fuel Co. v. Illinois Fuel Co., 219 Ill. App. 150
(1920), it is apparent that the seller did have such knowledge from the nature of the
articles sold.
22. 5 WLLISTON, CONTRACtS (Rev. ed. 1937) § 1347: "Even though no contract
for a resale has yet been made by the buyer, damages may be recovered for loss of
one, if the probability of such a resale was contemplated, and defendant knew that
other goods of the kind contracted for could not be obtained elsewhere by the buyer."
(italics added.)
23. Marcus & Co., Inc. v. K. L. G. Baking Co., Inc., 122 N. J. L. 202, 3 A. (2d)
627 (1939). In this case defendant, a baking concern, agreed to sell and deliver to
plaintiff, a dealer in bakery ovens, four used bakery ovens by a certain date. Defendant
delayed delivery, as a result of which plaintiff lost a contract of resale. The court held
that even though the parties contemplated an immediate resale, the plaintiff could
not recover such a resale profit, since there was no evidence "to suggest that the parties
here contemplated inability of the buyer to obtain equipment elsewhere for the per-
formance of such resale contract as it might make; rather the contrary." Czarnikow-
Rionda Co. v. Federal Sugar Refining Co., 255 N. Y. 33, 173 N. E. 913 (1930).
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Dosrrsrc RELATIONs-RiorT OF CMWREN TO SUE FOR INTERFERENCE wn
Tnm FA y RELATION AND SuPPOT.-The plaintiffs, four minor children, living
in Pennsylvania, bring this action in the federal court by their mother, as next
friend, for damages against the defendant, living in Illinois, alleging that she en-
ticed their father from their home and from them and caused him to go to Chicago
and live with her; causing the father to refuse to contribute to the maintenance
and support of the plaintiffs. The district court dismissed the complaint, as not
stating a cause of action. On appeal held, judgment unanimously reversed. The
complaint states a good cause of action. Dailey v. Parker, 152 F. (2d) 174
(C. C. A. 7th, 1945).
Recognition of a right, previously considered to be unprotected in the law, calls
for an evaluation of such judicial action. The fact that a right has hitherto been
unrecognized and that there is no precedent for the granting of a remedy for the
violation of that right is not a sufficient ground for the denial of a remedy to an
aggrieved party.1 However, recognition of such rights should not be dependent
on the whim or fancy of the judiciary, or the sympathies and natural propensities
aroused by a particular situation, but rather should be determined by advertence
to sound and established norms and principles deriving from the positive and
natural law. To what standards then must we adhere to resolve such a problem?
The rationale would appear to lie in the determination of two propositions, viz.,
first, is there a right in the plaintiff and a corresponding duty owed by the de-
fendant to the plaintiff, and secondly to what extent will and should the law enforce
that duty and protect that right.2
The respective rights of each member of a family in reference to the other
members involve, as the court points out, a broadening concept 3 Originally it
was believed, and so held, that the father as head of the family was sole re-
pository of all family rights. Man and woman were as one and that one was the
man.4 So for many years women were denied the right to recover for alienation
of their spouses' affections 5 and the husband was permitted recovery only on the
fiction of loss of services. 6 Both of these limitations were removed, however, and
recovery was permitted to both spouses, both in criminal conversation 7 or alienation
of affections,8 for loss of consortium.9 The fact that previously a wife's right to
her husband's consortium had never been recognized did not deter the recognition
1. CARnozo, GROWTH OF THE LAw (1924) passim; 1 Coo=ax, ToRTs (3d ed. 1906)
24, 25; Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584, 23 N. E. 17 (1889).
2. GRETH, RATIONALE OF PROXzATE CAUSE (1927) 1-43.
3. 152 F. (2d) 174 176 (C. C. A. 7th, 1945); Pound, Individual Interests in the
Domestic Relations (1916) 14 MIcH. L. Riv. 177, 179.
4. 1 BL. Comm.* 442.
5. Duffies v. Duffles, 76 Wisc. 374, 45 N. W. 522 (1890) wherein it ia held that
no cause of action would lie at common law or under the statutes permitting married
women to sue.
6. MADN, PERSONS AND DomEsnc RELATIONS (1931) 166.
7. Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N. Y. 156, 140 N. E. 227 (1923).
8. Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584, 23 N. E. 17 (1889).
9. ". . the weight of modem authority bases the action on the loss of the con-
sortium; that is, the society, companionship, conjugal affection, fellowship, and assistance.
MADDN, op. dt. supra, note 6, at 167.
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of her right by the courts.10 So, too, in the instant case the fact that there is no
exact precedent for the action should not be fatal to its maintenance.
It is fitting, therefore, to examine the precedents to determine whether the
present action is founded on established basic principles and flows naturally from
the reciprocal"- rights and duties attendant on the parent-child relationship. The
relationship of parent and child differs from the common law concept of man and
wife in that there is no unity of legal personality of parent and minor child.12
The obligations flowing from the parent-child relationship are conceived in the
natural and moral law.13 The prime duties the parent owes to the child are gen-
erally said to consist of protection,' 4 support, 15 guidance, 16 preservation 1 7 and
education.' 8 There are duties incumbent on the child in turn which give parents
the right to the custody,1 9 control20 and services and earnings2 1 of their offspring.
These rights in the parents it is said result from the duties they owe their children
10. KEEZER, MARRIAGE & DIVORCE (2d ed. 1923) § 150. "Any interference with these
[marital] rights, whether of the husband or of the wife, is a violation not only of a
natural right, but also of a legal right arising out of the marriage relation. It is a
wrongful interference with that which the law both confers and protects. A remedy, not
provided by statute but springing from the flexibility of the common law and its
adaptability to the changing nature of human affairs, has long existed for the redress
of the wrongs of the husband. As the wrongs of the wife are the same in principle
and are caused by acts of the same nature as those of the husband, the remedy s.hold
be the same." Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584, 590, 23 N. E. 17, 18 (1889).
11. Ramsey v. Ram~ey, 121 Ind. 215, 23 N. E. 69 (1889).
12. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 AUt. 905 (1930).
13. 1 BL.. Coimlk.* 447; O'Connell v. Turner, 55 III. 280 (1870).
14. Stanton v. Wilson, 3 Day 37 (Conn. 1808); Beigler v. Chamberlin, 138 Minn.
377, 165 N. W. 128 (1917); Win. v. Morley, 99 Mo. 484, 12 S. W. 798 (1890); In re
Moorhead's Estate, 289 Pa. 542, 137 Ad. 8Q2 (1927).
15. The parental duty to give personal care and protection to children is said to
be distinct from the duty to support. See 1 ScHOULER, LAW or Doa Sric RELATiONs
(6th ed. 1921) § 773.
16. So, too, a parent may advise foolishly and good faith will be presumed, and
such parent will not be liable in a suit for alienation of affection. Mowen v. Mowen,
64 S. D. 581, 269 N. W. 85 (1936).
17. People v. Pierson, 176 N. Y. 201, 68 N. E. 243 (1903) wherein it was held
that religious beliefs did not excuse from the duty of providing medical care for a
child and failure to fulfill this duty is a wrong which the state may punish under its
police power.
18. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925). Blackstone pronounces this
to be by far the greatest of all in importance. 1 BI. Comm.* 450.
19. ScnouLER, DoxEsric RELATiONs (5th ed. 1895) § 245 et seq. At common law
the father rather than the mother was said to be entitled to custody of the children.
2 STORY, EQuITY JURIsPRUDENcE (13th ed. 1886) §§ 1341, 1342; Porter v. Porter, 60
Fla; 407, 53 So. 546 (1912); Soper v. Igo, 121 Ky. 550, 89 S. W. 538 (1905). However,
this doctrine, like the theory on which it has been based, %6z., the legal unity of husband
and wife, (BLAcxsToNa, op. cit. supra, note 5) has been abrogated by statute in many
states. 4, VmanmR, Aamc=r FAmmy LAWS (1936) Table CXI.
20. 2 KENT, CoamrENARIEs (14th ed. 1896) 203; see also 1 BL. Comm,.* 452.
21. MADDEN, op. cit. supra, note 6, § 120.
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and are given them by way of aiding in the fulfillment of such duties and to act
as recompense. 22  Qut of these enumerated duties of parents and children flow
the rights of each. These rights the law considers valuable and in most cases
will protect, although it is questioned whether or not they may be classed as
property rights. It has been said that the parent's rights in the child are in the
nature of property rights,2 3 whereas it has been denied that the obligation imposed
by the relationship on the parent vests a property right in the children.
24
The question now to be considered, and the one in the instant case, is to what
extent will the law protect these rights? Parents' rights in the child are rather
fully protected, the relationship being deemed rather artificially to be that of
master and servant.25 Most actions by parents, therefore, are based on the fiction
of loss of service and the loss of opportunity to enjoy the child's earnings. This
is usually the foundation of the parent's action for damages for tort to the child
resulting in injury or death. 26 It was formerly also the basis for an action in
seduction by the father of the victim against the seducer.27 However, now the
courts are also inclined to consider other elements, viz., the shame to the family,
loss to the father of the companionship and comfort of the daughter. 28 The
common law, however, has never given formal recognition to the broad right of
the parent to the consortium of children as it has done in the relation of husband
and wife.2 9 So it has been held that no action will lie in favor of a parent against
one who alienates the affections of a child, and this is conceded universally to
be the law.30
The right of children to a fulfillment of parental duties was not enforceable at
common law by the children through suits directly against the parents. Such an
action was considered to infringe on the essential unity of the home.3 ' In some
jurisdictions the rule is based on lack of a common law wrong rather than on
any theory of policy.32 Usually the duty to support the child is enforced by the
state and a parent who does not fulfill this obligation may in addition be made
amenable to penal prosecution and penalty.33 This means of enforcement is purely
22. 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES (14th ed. 1896) 203.
23. Tidd v. Skinner, 225 N. Y. 522, 533, 122 N. E. 247, 251 (1919).
24. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202 (1933).
25. PROSSER, TORTS (1941) 916; Lawyer v. Fritcher, 130 N. Y. 239, 245, 29 N. E.
267, 268 (1891).
26. See Pickle v. Page, 252 N. Y. 474, 169 N. E. 650 (1930) for a discussion of the
elements of damage in such actions. RESTATEMANT, TORTS (1938) § 703, comment g., h.
27. Grinnell v. Wills, 7 Man & G. 1033, 135 Eng. Rep. 419 (C. P. 1844).
28. Pound, Individual Interests in Domestic Relations (1916) 14 MIcn. L. Rxv. 177,
184.
29. 1 STREET, The FOUNDATION OF LEGAL LABILITY, THEORY AND PICnIPLES OF TORT
(1906) 267.
30. Pyle v. Waechter, 202 Iowa 695, 210 N. W. 926 (1926); Miles v. Cuthbert et al.,
122 N. Y. Supp. 703 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
31. Rawlings v. Rawlings, 121 Miss. 140, 83 So. 146 (1919); Buchavan v. Buchavan,
170 Va. 458, 197 S. E. 426 (1938).
32. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 At]. 905 (1930).
33. For a complete compilation of comparative state law as to the duty of support
by the parent and the methods of enforcement, see 4 VERNIE, Aw a c FAmY
LAw (1936) Table CXII p. 66.
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statutory and is based on the theory that support of the child is essential to the
general welfare of society and of the state to prevent its becoming a public
charge.3
4
What right then has a child to sue a third person for either a tort against the
parent or for any interference with the family relation? At common law a child
was not allowed to sue a third person for tort to the child's parent.3 5 Today
under statute in some jurisdictions a child may sue for the wrongful death of
his parent 3 6 or, under the liquor statutes, for illegally selling liquor to the parent
causing intoxication of the parent and subsequent injury to the child.37 These
actions are based on the theory of the child's loss of the support of the parent. No-
where, however, has a child been permitted to sue a third person for alienation
of the parent's affections or interference with the family relations, without the
additional element of tort to the parent. This results from an application of the
principle that there is no right to consortium between parent and child.39 There
would appear to be a further reason in the instant case for denying relief for
alienation of affections, in that such actions have been deemed contra to the
public policy of both Pennsylvania and Illinois and so barred.40
Despite the admirable predilection of the court in the subject case to give the
children redress against their father's paramour by way of damages, it would
seem to be without the bounds of a proper exercise of "judicial empiricism." 41
Even if the action is based on loss of their father's support, it is questionable
whether, without benefit of statute, they have such a property right. The analogous
right of recovery for death of the parent and consequent loss of his sapport is
recognized only perforce of a statute. Certainly total extinction of the parent is
a wrong on as high a plane as separation from the parent and yet it required
legislation to give the child a cause of action for death of the parent.
34. Ethridge J., dissenting in Rawlings v. Rawlings, 121 Miss. 140 at 145, 83
So. 146 at 148 (1919) considers the denial of the right of action to the children
in the face of the statutory enforcement to be anomalous.
35. Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378, 263 N. W. 154 (1935).
36. 4 VENER, ArxaXcAN FAmmy LAWS (1936) § 266.
37. Ibid.
38. Morrow v. Yuantuono, 152 Misc. 134, 273 N. Y. Supp. 912 (Sup. Ct. 1934),
noted in (1935) 21 VA. L. REv. 443, 4 BR0oxvi L. REv. 217, 20 CoRN. L. Q. 255,
83 U. oF PA. L. Rv. 276. Recovery here was denied to the children against a third
person who enticed their mother from the home, first because the action was without
precedent and secondly because it would open the door to too much litigation.
39. See note 29 supra.
40. Kane, Heart Balm and Public Policy (1936) 5 FoRmHA L. Rxv. 63; Iix.
REv. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd 1939) C. 38 § 246; PA. LAws 1935, Act 189. However,
in a prior action by the mother of these children directly against the defendant in the
instant case, charging alienation of affections, despite these statutes, the district court
held she had a good cause of action in view of a "catch-all" statute relied on by the
plaintiffs in the principal case, viz., Art. 2 § 19 of the Illinois Constitution, wherein it
is provided "Every person ought to find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries
and wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or reputation ... " Daily v.
Parker, 61 F. Supp. 701 (N. D. Ill. 1945).
41. The court accepts and adopts Dean Pound's label as well as his philosophy with
regard to judicial law-making where precedent is lacking, 152 F. (2d) 174, 177. See,
PouND, THE SPIRIT OF THE ComoN LAw 183.
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Like all general maxims, the maxim ubi jus ibi remedium requires explanation.
"lus" in the maxim means a legally protected right.42 Without question both the
defendant and the children's father committed a grave moral and public wrong,
for which they may be punishable criminally.43 However, that fact does not answer
the question whether the children have been legally wronged. Their complaint is
that the defendant's act deprived them of their father's support and his society
and affection. The father's failure to support his children is a public wrong of
which the state takes cognizance by providing a remedy in a quasi-criminal pro-
ceeding.44 It would seem to be an unsound extension of the principles of proximate
(legal) cause and of vicarious liability to shift to the defendant the legal respon-
sibility for the father's omission, which the children under the common law could
not enforce by direct suit against the father.45 A recovery by the children of
damages for loss of their father's affection and society is equally questionable.
Unfortunately there are many rights in the moral order which the law refuses to
enforce to the extent of requiring the payment of money to the person wronged,
even though the wrong is recognized and condemned. Practical considerations of
public policy, especially the discouragement of spurious and fraudulent claims, may
impel the courts, though often unwillingly, to deny recompense to the person
harmed. 46 The law must at times balance the denial of compensation in meritorious
cases against the recovery, or the threat of recovery, in others. In addition the
affection and society of a man, whether as a husband or father, in the final
analysis depends upon him, and is hardly measurable in dollars and cents. Their
loss, even when enticed away by another, should not be a compensable item of
recovery in a civil action, and in this type of case, no legitimate purpose can be
served by the recovery of merely nominal damages. 47
EMERGENCY PRICE CONTROL ACT-CIVIL ACTION FOR CEILING VIOLATION-
REMEDIAL OR PENAL-SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS.-The administrator of the decedent's
estate brought an action under § 205 (e) of the Emergency Price Control Act
of 1942, as amended, to recover for alleged overcharges of rent exacted from the
decedent by the defendant. The 'plaintiff demanded $50 for each overcharge to-
gether with attorney's fees and costs. Held, four justices dissenting, complaint
dismissed. The cause of action did not survive the death of plaintiff's intestate
since it was an action for a penalty. Stevenson v. Stoufer, - Iowa -, 21 N. W.
(2d) 287 (1946).
The survival of an action such as the one in the instant case has been thought
to depend upon whether § 205 (e) of the Emergency Price Control Act1 provides
42. BROoM, LEGAL MAXiMs (10th ed. 1939) 118.
43. ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd 1939) C. 38 § 46.
44. See note 33 supra.
45. Ibid.
46. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N. Y. 107 (1896). See Kane, Heart Balm and
Public Policy (1936) 5 FoaunAr L. REV. 63.
47. McCoRmAcic, DAMAGES (1935) § 24.
1. 56 STAT. 23 (1942) as amended 56 STAT. 767, 50 U. S. C. A. ApP. § 901 et seq.
(1944).
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for a penalty or a remedy.2 At common law it was held that only causes of
action based upon damage to property survived, and that all other causes of
action abated upon the death of either party. More accurately stated, the general
rule is that causes of action of a personal nature did not survive, whereas those
causes of action based upon injury to property did survive 3 There are various
statutes which change this rule to some extent, and provide that even some causes
of action which are of a personal nature survive.4 Where the cause of action is
based upon a federal statute which makes no provision for survival of actions
commenced under that statute, then the common law rule is applied.5 Since the
Emergency Price Control Act makes no provision for survival of actions brought
under it, one must examine the common law to determine whether the cause of
action is one that will survive.
The majority and minority opinions in the principal case, as well as opinions
in cases involving similar questions of survival, for the most part base their con-
clusions on the determination whether the action is remedial or penal. The as-
sumption seems to be that if the action is remedial, it survives. This assumption
does not appear to be warranted. A remedial action is one which is intended to
furnish compensation to a party; a penal action is one which imposes a penalty
for an offense committed.6 Under the common law an action to recover a penalty
does not survive because it is of a personal nature and is not intended just as
compensation for any wrong committed against the aggrieved party.7 Therefore,
if one considers an action brought under § 205 (e) of the Emergency Price Control
Act to provide for the recovery of Only a penalty, then it is clear that such an
action would not survive the death of either party.8 In determining whether the
Act provides for the recovery of a penalty or a remedy, many courts have relied
on the case of Huntington v. Attrill.9 In that case the court attempts to draw a
2. In addition the nature of the action (whether penal or remedial) may determine
whether the constitutional guaranties 'such as the privilege against self-incrimination,
jury trial, confrontation of witnesses, etc. will be accorded to the defendant. See (1945)
14 FoRDAw L. Rav. 239; Bowles v. Seitz, 62 F. Supp. 773 (W. D. Tenn. 1945).
3. HARmPE, A TEATisE ON THE LAW or TORTS (1933) § 301, at p. 674. For a dis-
cussion of the suggested origin of this rule see PROSSER, HANDBOOK or TH LAW OF
TORTS (1941) 950-954.
4. N. Y. Dxc. EsT. LAw § 119 provides that a cause of action for injury to person
or property shall not be lost because of the death of the person in whose favor the
action existed. For a comparative study of similar statutes in other jurisdictions, see
Legis. (1936) 24 CAns'. L. Rav. 716; Legis. (1935) 48 HA.v. L. Rxv. 1008.
5. Barnes Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merchants Ass'n, 128 .F. (2d) 645, 648 (C. C. A.
4th, 1942) ; Sullivan v. Associated Bill Posters, 6 F. (2d) 1000, 1004 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925);
United States v. Leche, 44 F. Supp. 765, 766 (E. D. La. 1942).
6. United States v. Joles, 251 Fed. 417, 419 (D. Mass. 1917); Iowa v. Chicago, B.
& Q. R. Co., 37 Fed. 497 (S. D. Iowa 1889).
7. Schreiber v. Sharpless, 110 U. S. 76 (1884); 2 CARmony, NEw YORE PRAcncE
(2d ed. 1930) § 772, p. 1419.
8. But see Sullivan v. Associated BiIlposters, 6 F. (2d) 1000, 1009 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
"If a statute which is penal in part gives a remedy for an injury to the person injured
to the extent that it gives such a remedy it is a remedial statute, irrespective of whether
it limits the recovery to the amount of actual loss sustained or as cumulative damages
as compensation for the injury."
9. 146 U. S. 657 (1892).
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distinction between a penal action and a remedial one, but the distinction drawn
is not precisel o and the case has been cited with approval by courts which hold
the Act provides for a penalty," and those which say that it provides for a
remedy.' 2 At first it would seem that the civil action granted to the consumer
does provide for a penalty because the damages awarded are so far in excess of
the actual damage suffered.' 3 Support for such a view may be derived by com-
Paring the action with one in which punitive damages are claimed. Punitive
damages are generally considered to be non-compensatory 14 and in the absence of
10. Id. at p. 667. "Statutes giving a private action against the wrongdoer are
sometimes spoken of as penal in their nature, but in such cases it has been pointed
out that neither the liability imposed nor the remedy given is strictly penal." "...
'penal' and 'penalty' have been used in various senses. Strictly and primarily, they
denote punishment, whether corporal or pecuniary, imposed and enforced by the State,
for a crime or offence against its laws. . . But they are also commonly used as including
any extraordinary liability to which the law subjects a wrongdoer in favor of the person
wronged, not limited to the damages suffered."
11. Bowles v. Bank of Lebanon, 147 F. (2d) 425 (C. C. A. 6th, 1945); Bowles v.
Trowbridge, 60 F. Supp. 48 (N. D. Cal. 1945).
12. Bowles v. Seitz, 62 F. Supp. 773 (W. D. Tenn. 1945); Bowles v. Chew, 53 F.
Supp. 787 (N. D. Cal. 1945); Whatley v. Love, - La. App. -, 13 So. (2d) 719 (1943).
13. In Helwig v. United States, 188 U. S. 605 (1903) an action was brought in
behalf of the United States to recover damages from the defendant as a penalty for.
not declaring the true value of imports. The statute under consideration in that case
provided that the United States could recover 2% for each 19 that the import was
worth above the declared value. The court said (at p. 612) that the statute termed
the money demanded as a "further sum," that it was not described as a penalty, but
that in spite of that terminology the extra sum demanded was really a penalty. The
court went on to say (at p. 613) that the very nature of the statute was penal. In
St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U. S. 63 (1919) the court held that an Arkansas
statute, which provided that passengers who were charged more than a certain rate
per mile could institute an action to recover not less than $50 and not more than $300,
was clearly penal.
14. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) § 908; Demogue, Validity of the Theory of Com-
pensatory Damages (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 585, 590. Some few jurisdictions refuse
to permit the recovery of exemplary damages on the ground that they are not com-
pensatory and are essentially penal in nature. Boott Mills v. Boston & M. R. R.
Co., 218 Mass. 582, 106 N. E. 680 (1914); Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2
Wash. 45, 25 Pac. 1072 (1891). Nevertheless jurisdictions which limit the recovery of
punitive damages to the amount expended in bringing the suit apparently consider
them compensatory to that extent. Craney v. Donovan, 92 Conn. 236, 102 Atl. 640
(1917) ; Titus v. Corkins, 21 Kan. 722 (1879); See Popke v. Hoffman, 21 Ohio App.
454, 153 N. E. 248 (1926); cf. Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 362 (U. S. 1851). Most
jurisdictions place no such limitation upon the recovery of punitive damages, except
that in some jurisdictions the amount of punitive damages which may be awarded
must bear some reasonable proportion to the actual damages suffered. Hall Oil Co. v.
Barquin, 33 Wyo. 92, 237 Pac. 255 (1925). But the punitive damages may exceed the
actual and no definite ratio is prescribed. Taylor v. Williamson, 197 Iowa 88, 196
N. W. 713 (1924). In New York the rule of proportion does not seem to be empha-
sized, since punitive damages may be awarded where there is evidence that the actual
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a statute, do not survive the death of the person wronged.15 One working test
of the survivorability of an action is whether it can be assigned.16 A claim for
punitive damages is not assignable' 7 and it would seem that the same is true
of an action provided for in the Emergency Price Control Act. The statute spe-
cifically gives the action to ". . the person who buys such commodity. .. "
provided it is brought within one year and provided further that the Adminis-
trator has not brought a similar action.' 8 These provisions clearly indicate the
non-assignability of the action.
Congress has said that its purpose in enacting the statute under discussion was
to stabilize prices, to prevent inflation, and to prevent hardships to federal, state,
and local governments which would result from abnormal increases in prices.' 9
There is a controversy whether a suit brought by the Administrator is remedial
or penal in nature. Offhand, it would seem that such a suit should be considered.
penal and some courts have so held.20 But other courts have held, even when
the Administrator brings the action, that it is still remedial, and is penal only
as to the defendant, 21 on the ground that the Administrator is acting for the
United States Government and is really obtaining compensation for the public
on account of the disastrous results which follow from inflation. Moreover, courts
which hold that the Administrator's action is a remedial one point out that criminal
damages were very slight. Buteau v. NaegeHi, 124 Misc. 470, 208 N. Y. Supp. 504
(Sup. Ct. 1925), new trial granted without opinion, 216 App. Div. 833, 215 N. Y. Supp.
823 (1st Dep't 1926); Prince v. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 16 Misc. 186, 37 N. Y. Supp.
250 (Sup. Ct. 1896). See RESTATERmT, TORTS (1939) § 908, comment c.
15. Sheik v. Hobson, 64 Iowa 46, 19 N. W. 875 (1884); 1 SEDGWiCK, A TREATiSE ON
THE MEAsURE or DAMAGES (9th ed. 1920) § 362.
16. Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 I1. 571, 162 N. E. 170 (1928); Brackett v. Griswold, 103
N. Y. 425 (1886);. Hegerich v. Keddie, 99 N. Y. 258 (1885); Tucker v. Western Union
Telegraph, 98 Misc. 364, 157 N. Y. Supp. 873 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
17. French v. Orange County Inn. Corp., 125 Cal. App. 487, 13 P. (2d) 1046 (1932).
18. 56 STAT. 33 (1942) as amended, 58 STAT. 640, 50 U. S. C. A. ApP. § 925 (e)
(1944).
19. 56 STAT. 23 (1942) as amended, 58 STAT. 767, 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 901 (a) (1944).
20. Bowles v. Bank of Lebanon, 147 F. (2d) 425 (C. C. A. 6th, 1945), at p. 428:
.if a sum of money is to be recovered by a third person for violation of a statute
instead of the person injured, or if the sum exacted is greatly disproportionate to the
actual loss, it constitutes a penalty rather than damages. The fact that the sum is to
be recovered in a civil action does not determine the nature of the exaction." The
court said in Brown v. Cummins Distilleries Corp., 56 F. Supp. 941, 942 (W. D. Ky.
1944) that "In a proceeding of this nature the plaintiff has suffered no damages, and
the action is not for the purpose of compensation," and that "the action is essentially
one for the recovery of a penalty." Also see Bowles v. Trowbridge, 60 F. Supp. 48,
49 (N. D. Cal. 1945).
21. In Bowles v. Berard, 57 F. Supp. 94, 95 (E. D. Wis. 1944), the court says that
the history of the act shows it is remedial and also notes that the statute of limitations
is one year as dusinguished from the five year statute of limitations applicable to penal
statutes. In Bowles v. Chew, 53 F. Supp. 787 (N. D. Cal. 1944), the court holds that
it is not penal in the sense that it is punishment for an offense against the state which
the Executive may pardon. See Bowles v. Kroger Grocery and Baking Co., 141 F.
(2d) 120, 121 (C. C. A. 8th, 1944).
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proceedings may be instituted under § 205 (b) of the Act and that this indicates
that Congress intended that the Administrator's civil action under § 205 (e) be
considered a remedial one.2 2 There are few cases where the Administrator insti-
tuted an action against the wrongdoer's etate, but there the courts have held
that the action would not lie because it was penal in nature.23 These holdings
can be justified on the theory that a suit by the Administrator is to recover a
penalty rather than compensation. 24 However, if the purpose of the Administrator's
suit is to compensate the United States Government for damages it has suffered
due to defendant's contribution to inflation, such a suit against the estate of the
wrongdoer should be allowed. At least one court, in a suit by an aggrieved con-
sumer, held the estate of the deceased violator liable.2 5
There seems to be less diversity of opinion, at least in the federal courts, when
the aggrieved consumer brings the action. These courts have generally held that
the action is a remedial one26 on the theory that the plaintiff in such an action
is seeking compensation for damages he has suffered, and the mere circumstance
that his recovery is greater than the actual damage suffered should not make the
action any less a remedial one.2 7 Where actions have been instituted in the state
22. Bowles v. American Stores, 139 F. (2d) 377 (U. S. C. A., D. C. 1943); Bowles
v. Seitz, 62 F. Supp. 773 (W. D. Tenn. 1945); also see Lambros v. Brown, - Md. -,
41 A. (2d) 78 (1945).
23. Bowles v. Farmers National Bank, 147 F. (2d) 425 (C..C. A. 6th, 1945); Brown
v. Cummins Distilleries Corp., 56 F. Supp. 941 (W. D. Ky. 1944).
24. In this connection a distinction may be urged between the question of the survival
of the action in favor of a plaintiff's estate and its survival against the estate of a
violator. It has been said that Section 205 (e) of the Emergency Price Control Act
"...is penal as against the defendant. . . and remedial in favor of the plaintiff. .. "
Ward v. Bochino, 181 Misc. 355, 358, 46 N. Y. S. (2d) 54, 57 (Sup. Ct. 1944); also
see Gilbert v. Thierry, 58 F. Supp. 235, 240 (D. Mass. 1945) ; Hall v. Chaltis, 31 A. (2d)
699, 702 (D. C. Munic. Ct. App. 1943); Beasley v. Gottlieb, 131 N. J. L. 117, 35 A.
(2d) 49, 52 (1943). Both the majority and minority opinions in the principal case
refer to two Iowa cases, Sheik v. Hobson, 64 Iowa 146, 19 N. W. 875 (1884) and
Union Mill Co. v. Prenzler, 100 Iowa 540, 69 N. W. 876 (1897), involving the question
of the survival of an action for punitive damages. In the former case the court held
that the claim for punitive damages did not survive the death of the wrongdoer. In
the latter case the claim for punitive damages was held to survive the death of the
party wronged, the court saying: "The case of Sheik v. Hobson, relied upon by ap-
pellant, was decided upon different principles. It was there said that the punitory
power of the law ceased when the defendant dies, and that the civil law never inflicts
vicarious punishment. Such a rule has no possible application to this case, unless the
rule is to be applied both ways. We do not think, however, that it should be so applied,
for reasons which are so apparent as to need no further elaboration." Union Mill Co.
v. Prenzler, supra at 543, 69 N. W. at 878 (1897). It should be noted, however, that
in the case from which the quotation is taken the claim for punitive damages was
held to survive merely because the action had been commenced by the deceased.
25. Everly v. Zepp, 57 F. Supp. 303, 304 (E. D. Penn. 1944).
26. Lambur v. Yates, 148 F. (2d) 137, 139 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945); Dorsey v. Martin.
58 F. Supp. 722, 723 (E. D. Penn. 1945); Gilbert v. Thierry, 58 F. Supp. 235, 240
(D. Mass. 1945); Everly v. Zepp, 57 F. Supp. 303, 304 (E. D. Penn. 1944).
27. Brady v. Daly, 175 U. S. 148, 154 (1899); Schaffer v. Leimberg, - Mass. -,
62 N. E. (2d) 193 (1945). See note 14 supra.
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courts under the Act, which confers concurrent jurisdiction upon them,2 there
is more disagreemeht as to the nature of the action.29
Some aid in determining the nature of the action may be obtained by comparing
it with a qui tam action ° such as a statutory informer's suit a l  the latter type
of action the statute generally provides that a person who has defrauded the
government may be the object of a civil suit by a private individual, and damages
awarded are payable in part to the informer plaintiff and in part to the govern-
ment.3 2 The courts consider such a suit remedial in nature, for the reason that
the recovery provides restitution to the government of money taken from it by
fraud, as and as to the plaintiff informer it constitutes for the most part a reward.
4
In no wise could the suit be considered as remedying any harm done to the
individual plaintiff and the very nature and purpose of the recovery by the in-
former would seem to foreclose the assignment by him of the action or its survival
to his personal representative.85
It would seem that the majority opinion in the principal case reaches the more
sound result. Whether the action by a consumer is remedial or penal is, as the
above discussion indicates, a close question. However, a determination of that
question is not necessarily controlling in the instant case. While dearly an action
to recover a penalty does not survive, it does not follow that every remedial
action does survive. Even if we conclude that the consumer's action is remedial,
the common law principles governing the survival of actions would seem to preclude
a suit by the personal representative of the consumer.
FEDER. INcomE TAx-CAPiTAL AssETs-SALE oY GoIxG BUsNEss.-The tax-,
payer, surviving member of a partnership engaged in the hardware business, piir-
28. 56 STAT. 33 (1942) as amended, 58 STAT. 640, 50 U. S. CA. App. § 925 (c) (1944).
29. An action has been held to be penal in Campbell v. Heiss, 222 Ind. 297, 53
N. E. (2d) 634, 635 (1944); Hall v. Chaltis, 31 A. (2d) 699 (D. C. Munic. Ct. App.
1943); and remedial in Bendit v. H. L. R. Holding Co., 131 N. J. L. 91, 35 A. (2d)
53 (1944); Kaplan v. Arkellian, 21 N. 3. Misc. 209, 32 A. (2d) 725, 727 (1943);
Kerr v. Congel, 181 Misc. 461, 464, 46 N. Y. S. (2d) 932," 934 (Munic. Ct. 1944).
30. BLAcx, LAw DIcTxONARY (3d ed. 1933) at p. 1482. A qui tam action is one
brought by an informer under a statute which establishes a penalty for the omission
or commission of a certain act and provides that the penalty is recoverable in part
to the plaintiff informer and in part to the government.
31. It has been pointed out that the Emergency Price Control Act is not intended
to turn consumers into informers. Tropp v. Great At]. & Pac. Tea Co., 71 N. J. Misc.
205, 32 A. (2d) 717 (1943).
32. United States ex rel Marcus v. Hess, 317 U. S. 537 (1943), at p. 540. The statute
in question provided that half of the recovery was to be awarded to the informer and
half to the government.
33. Id. at p. 551.
34. Id. at p. 546.
35. The United States is the real party in interest, United States v. Baker-Lockwood
Mfg. Co., Inc., 138 F. (2d) 48 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943). The interest of the informer in
the action is solely to secure the reward for successful prosecution of the suit and not
necessarily for information furnished to the government. United States ex rel Marcus
v. Hess, 317 U. S. 537 (1942).
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chased his deceased partner's interest, and thereupon sold the business as a whole,
including cash on hand and on deposit, accounts, notes and bills receivable, mer-
chandise, fixtures and all other assets, thereby suffering a loss which he deducted
in determining his ordinary income for the year 1940. The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue disallowed such treatment of the loss contending it was one
suffered on the sale of "capital assets" and assessed a deficiency accordingly which
the taxpayer paid. Taxpayer's action to recover such assessment was dismissed
by the District Court. Upon appeal, held, one judge dissenting, that the whole
business was not to be treated as a single property, but rather that it was to be
"comminuted into its fragments" and that gain or loss was to be computed as
on the sale of each asset, such gains and losses then being classified as capital
gains and losses or ordinary income. Williams v. McGowan, 152 F. (2d) 570
(C. C. A. 2d, 1945).
The term "capital assets," as defined in the Internal Revenue Code' embraces
any property held by the taxpayer except stock in trade, property held primarily
for sale to customers or depreciable property used in the trade or business.2
Therefore, any asset is a capital asset unless it is one of the types specifically
excluded from that category. In determining whether or not an asset is a capital
asset, no principle of construction such as that of strict construction of an ex-
emption section against the taxpayer 3 can be employed. This is so because whether
or not the taxpayer will be benefited by the sale or exchange of the asset depends
upon whether a gain or loss will result.
The court in the principal case took cognizance of the statement in several
decisions that a partner's interest in a going firm is a capital asset. 4 An analysis
of those cases, however, would indicate that whether or not a partnership is
treated today as though it were an entity5 the probable rule is that the court
will look to the specific assets sold rather than to the partner's partnership interest.
Where a partner's gain on a sale represented his share of ordinary income not yet
collected by the firm, it was held that his gain was ordinary income. 6 On the
other hand, where his gain was occasioned by 'an appreciation in the value
of capital assets owned by the partnership, he has been held to have had
gain from a capital transaction.7 True, the court held' in Commissioner v.
1. Int. Rev. Code § 117 (a) (1) (1944).
2. By amendments subsequent to the taxable year involved in the principal case
the following additional exceptions have been made: real property used in the trade
or business, Revenue Act of 1942, § 151 (a); certain obligations .of the United States,
individual States, etc., Revenue Act of 1941 § 115 (b).
3. Helvering v. Northwest Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., 311 U. S. 46 (1940).
4. Stilgenbaur v. United States, 115 F. (2d) 283 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940).
5. Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Criticism (1915) 28 HARv. L. REv. 762;
Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism (1916) 29
HARv. L. REv. 158, 291; Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act and Legal Persons (1916)
29 HARv. L. REV. 838.
6. Helvering v. Smith, 90 F. (2d) 590 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937); Doyle v. Commissioner,
102 F. (2d) 86 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939).
7. Munson v. Commissioner, 100 F. (2d) 363 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); Stilgenbaur v.
United States, 115 F. (2d) 283 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940); McClellan v. Commissioner, 117
F. (2d) 988 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
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Shapiro8 that the aggregate of the partnership assets, together with the value of
the going business, constituted a capital asset. Although the partnership there
held such non-capital assets as inventories, there was nothing to indicate that
any portion of the gain involved was allocable thereto, and the ultimate holding
may be reconciled with the hypothesis suggested above on the theory that the
value of a going business above the value of its constituent part, namely, its good-
will, is a capital asset and that the gain in question was attributable solely thereto.
However the rule may be ultimately determined where there is a sale by a partner-
ship, the Court found in the principal case that the partnership had terminated
prior to the sale involved and that the taxpayer sold as the sole proprietor of
the business.
Finding the partnership line of cases inapplicable, the Court searched without
success for a basis for the contention of the Commissioner that a business owned
by a sole proprietor might be considered something separate and apart from, or
as one thing composed of and yet different from, its components. The refusal of
our law to accept the concepts of unity of aggregates found in the civil law such
as universitas juris, universitas facti, universitas rerum,9 its hesitancy in recognizing
the concept of a corporate entity and its continued refusal to recognize a partner-
ship entity, all weighed against the recognition by the court of a business which
might be considered the subject of a sale as a juristic entity, particularly in view
of the language of the statute which does speak of specific types of assets to be
excluded from the general classification of capital assets without any express ex-
ception. The conclusion was reached, therefore, by the majority of the court,
that Congress did mean to comminute the elements of a business and that each
asset transfered should be separately matched against the statutory definition to
determine its character. Thus the Court resolved the problem in such fashion
that a taxpayer planning to sell his business might not, by the form in which
he effected his purpose, choose the more advantageous of two tax treatments.
For example, the import of the decision in the principal case would seem to be
that a taxpayer may not, by selling his business as a whole or by selling the
non-capital assets forming a part of the business, create a capital gain, with a
minimum tax if profit is to result or an ordinary loss, deductible in full, if a loss
will result. 10 The principle underlying the decision in the instant case which pre-
vents such selection of tax advantages has been circumvented by at least one tax-
payer who organized a corporation to which he transferred his business in exchange
for shares of stock of the corporation and then sold the stock to a purchaser.'"
In determining his holding period of the stock, that period, during which the
property given in exchange had been held, was included.12 Warning that such a
8. 125 F. (2d) 532 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942).
9. MACKELDEY, RomAM LAw (Dropsie's ed. 1883) 3162.
10. Section 117 (j) and (k) of the Internal Revenue Code provides for the tax-
payer's election to treat gain or loss from the sale of real or depreciable property used
in the trade or business or from the cutting of timber as ordinary income or loss or
as capital gains and losses if such property has been held for six months. This provision
does not affect the definition of capital assets, however.
11. Euleon Jock Gracey, 5 T. C. 296 (1945).
12. Section 117 (h) (I) of the Internal Revenue Code provides: "In determining
the period for which the taxpayer has held property received on an exchange there shall
be included the period for which he held the property exchanged, if under the provisions
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procedure may not be used as a device to avoid taxation is to be found in the
many cases involving the disregard of the corporate entity.' 3 Also, a purchaser
might decline to enter into such an arrangement if he did not want to retain
the corporate form because, even though he were to liquidate the corporation
immediately, the basis of the property might well vary from the price paid for
the stock by reason of a gain or loss recognition on the liquidation.14
The problem of establishing both the basis for determining gain or loss and the
allocated selling price of each asset transferred in the sale of a going business is
not a simple one and the burden of establishing them in the event of dispute
rests upon the taxpayer.' 5 As in every case where a question of fact is involved,
the taxpayer must show that the Commissioner erred or was arbitrary in his
determination.' 6 When, however, the taxpayer has submitted competent evidence
to support his contention the presumption of the correctness of the commissioner's
findings disappears and the issue must be decided upon a consideration of the
evidence submifted.17
In the principal case, the court pointed out that the fixtures sold were not
capital assets because they were subject to an allowance for depredation, nor
were the inventories, specifically excluded by definition. Although no allowance
for goodwill appeared to have been made, the court volunteered the opinion that
goodwill was a depreciable intangible.' 8 Does it not seem anomalous to indulge
in an assumption thai there is a measurable annual loss in value of an asset such
as goodwill, having a life of unpredictable duration which may as readily increase
as decrease in value without regard to the passage of time? The court here cited
no authority for its generalization and diligent search has disclosed none. Allow-
ance for depreciation of sales contracts has been denied, however, where their
of section 113, the property received has, for -the purpose of determining gain or loss
from a sale or exchange, the same basis in whole or in part in his hands as the property
exchanged." In Thornley v. Commissioner, 147 F. (2d) 416 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945), the
court held that the holding period of stock received in exchange for the assets of a
partnership dates back to the acquisition of the partnership interest.
13. Leading cases on the disregard of the corporate entity for the purpose of Federal
income taxation are: Higgins v. Smith, 308 U. S. 473 (1940) (entity disregarded); Moline
Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U. S. 436 (1943) (entity recognized).
14. Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Motter, 66 F. (2d) 309 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933); Com-
missioner v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co., 99 F. (2d) 588 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938), cert.
denied, 306 U. S. 661 (1939); Warner Company v. Commissioner, 26 B. T. A. 1225
(1932), approved in Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Motter, 66 F. (2d) 309 (C. C. A. 10th,
1933).
15. As to the basis, see T. H. Symington & Son, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 B. T. A. 711
(1937); as to selling price, see Ida P. Huggins, Memo. T. C., April 17, 1943, Docket
No. 109-539.
16. Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U. S. 507 (1935); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U. S. 111
(1933); Lucas v. Kansas City Structural Steel Co., 281 U. S. 264 (1930); Wickwire v.
Reinecke, 275 U. S. 101 (1927).
17. San Joaquin Brick Co. v. Commissioner, 130 F. (2d) 220 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942);
J. M. Perry & Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 120 F. (2d) 123 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941).
18. "No deduction for depredation, including obsolescence, is allowable in respect
of good will.' Income tax, Reg. 111, § 29.23 (1)-3; Reg. 103, § 19.23 (1)-3, Reg. 101,
Art. 23 (1)-3; Reg. 94, Art. 23 (1)-3; Reg. 45, Art. 163; Reg. 33, Art 167.
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cost could not be disassociated from that of goodwill contemporaneously acquired.19
A deduction for obsolescence of goodwill has been uniformly denied.
The question as to whether accounts receivable were to be considered capital
assets or not was not argued before the court and it was, therefore, left open
for decision by the district court in the event it should not be disposed of by
agreement. In another case, however, where an entire business (a branch estab-
lishment) was sold, the selling price consisting of the inventory price of goods
on hand plus the face value of notes and accounts receivable less a discount,
the court found the notes and accounts receivable to be capital assets because
they could not be brought within any of the classifications constituting the
exceptions.21 Similarly losses on deposit accounts in defaulting banks have been
considered capital losses.22 Where, however, in order for a taxpayer to sell mer-
chandise to a particular customer of dubious credit standing it was necessary to
take as payment trade acceptances and the sales price was inflated in accordance
with the risk involved, the taxpayer was permitted to deduct from ordinary income
a loss on the sale of the trade acceptances.23
The instant case has followed what would appear to be a policy, admirable in
view of the method of definition of capital assets employed in the Internal Revenue
Code, of strictly construing the exceptions to the generalization that all property
is "capital assets." Such a policy lends certainty to the law and Congress has been
ready to give to the taxpayer more than justice where practical application of
the statute has produced hardship.24
MORTGAGES-DEFICIENCY JUDGBmENTS-EFFECT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PRO-
VISIONS PROHIBITING IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTSM-In 1922 defendant and her
'husband executed in favor of plaintiff a note for $8000 secured by a mortgage.
In September, 1941, plaintiff instituted action to foreclose the mortgage and ob-
tained a judgment for $10,222.46, representing principal, interest, attorneys' fees
and costs. At the foreclosure sale, plaintiff purchased the land for $3500. When
19. United States Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Commissioner, 42 B. T. A. 1323 (1940),
137 F. (2d) 511 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
20. Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willcuts, 15 F. (2d) 626 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Lands-
berger v. McLaughlin, 20 F. (2d) 977, aff'd, 26 F. (2d) 77 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928); Clarke
v. The Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co., 280 U. S. 384 (1930) rev'g 30 F. (2d)
219 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929); G. F. Coshland & Co. v. Commissioner, 7 B. T. A. 680 (1927),
aff'd, 31 F. (2d) 1012 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929); Renziehausen v. Lucas, 280 U. S. 387 (1930)
aff'g, 31 F. (2d) 675 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929); Hupfel Co. v. Anderson, 51 F. (2d) 115,
aff'd, 55 F. (2d) 1080 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932). In all of the above cases the loss of good
will was occasioned by the enactment of national prohibition. Learned Hand, J., in
his opinion in the principal case deems this fact to be a significant distinction.
21. Graham Mill & Elevator Co. v. Thomas, 152 F. (2d) 564 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945).
See also Levy v. Commissioner, 131 F. (2d) 544 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942) aff'g, 46 B. T. A.
423 (1942).
22. I. T. 2853, XVI Cum. BuLL. 110 (1935), Ralph Perkins, et al. v. Commissioner,
41 B. T. A. 1225, aff'd on other grounds, 125 F. (2d) 150 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942).
23. Hercules Motor Corp. v. Commissioner, 40 B. T. A. 998 (1939). The Com-
missioner has not acquiesced in this decision, XXI Curs BuLL. 7 (1940).
24. See amendments to the Internal Revenue Code indicated in notes 2 and 6 supra.
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plaintiff moved for a deficiency judgment, the court found that the fair and
reasonable market value of the land at the date of the sale was $8000, and gave
a deficiency judgment for only $2222.46. Plaintiff appealed from the deficiency
judgment, claiming that the Act of Legislature approved on May 5, 1941 altering
the basis for determining the amount of the deficiency by substituting the fair
and reasonable market value of the mortgaged premises for the proceeds of the
foreclosure sale, is an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of the mort-
gage executed prior to its enactment, being in violation of Article II, Section 15
of the Oklahoma Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of
the United States. Held, four justices dissenting, where the mortgagee is the pur-
chaser, the statute is not unconstitutional. Alliance Trust Company, Limited v.
Hill, - Okla. -, 164 P. (2d) 984 (1946).
The decision is based squarely on the holding in Gelfert v. National City Bank,'
in which the Supreme Court, reversing the New York Court of Appeals, 2 held a
similar provision of the New York law constitutional as applied to a case in
which the mortgagee was, as here, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale. In the
Gelfert case the Supreme Court recognized the right of the Legislature to regu-
larize the power of equity courts to refuse to base deficiency judgments solely
on the foreclosure sale price-a power which equity courts had hitherto exercised
in cases of gross inadequacy of price, or fraud.3 It decided that such legislation
does not contravene the provision in the United States Constitution against im-
pairment of contracts.4
In the instant case the court had to consider not only this provision, but a
parallel one in the Oklahoma Constitution. 5 The majority, after reviewing the
Gelfert decision and finding it to be based on a situation similar to this one,
stated that the wording of the federal and Oklahoma constitutions was substantially
the same and that, therefore, the statute called into question did not violate either
of them. The minority, relying on an Ohio case,6 pointed out that a Supreme
Court interpretation of a clause in the United States Constitution is not binding
upon a state court in construing a similar clause in the state constitution. Although
the portion of the Ohio opinion which was relied upon was not necessary to the
Ohio court's conclusion, the proposition is sustained elsewhere. 7 A Supreme Court
interpretation of the United States Constitution is, however, strongly persuasive
and will ordinarily be given by the state courts to a similar provision of a state
constitution.8
1. 313 U. S. 221 (1941), 11 BRooxLYN L. REV. 103, 30 CALiF. L. REV. 71, 36 ILL. L.
REV. 465, 16 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 143, 16 TEMP. L. Q. 91, 27 VA. L. REV. 1092.
2. National City Bank v. Gelfert, 284 N. Y. 13, 29 N. E. (2d) 449 (1941).
3. Ballentyne v. Smith, 205 U. S. 285 (1907).
4. U. S. CoNsr. ART. I, § 10.
5. Okla. Stat. 1941, Title 12, § 686.
6. Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. City of Dayton, 138 Ohio St. 540, 38 N. E. (2d)
70, 73 (1941).
7. State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 220 Pac. 704 (1923); Commonwealth v. Wilkins,
243 Mass. 356, 138 N. E. 11 (1923); cf. Langever v. Miller, 124 Tex. 80, 76 S. W.
(2d) 1025 (1934). Contra: Lake County v. Morris, 160 Tenn. 619, 28 S. W. (2d) 351
(1930).
8. City of Portland v. Thornton, 176 Ore. 509, 149 P. (2d) 972 (1944); Morgan
v. Civil Service Comm. 131 N. J. L. 410, 36 A. (2d) 898 (1944); In re Weiden's
Estate, 263 N. Y. 107, 188 N. E. 270 (1933).
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The instant case is not the only one in which this persuasiveness has been
demonstrated on the matter of deficiency judgments. The Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania, in Fidelity Philadelphia Trust Company v. Allen,9 overruled its own pre-
vious decision'10 in which a Pennsylvania Deficiency Judgment Act had been held
unconstitutional. It did so on the ground that it is desirable to preserve uniformity
of construction of the contract clauses of the federal and state constitutions. A
California court also refused to go counter to the Gelfert line of reasoning. In
Ware v. Heller," plaintiff obtained summary judgment on a note and deed of trust
executed in 1931, prior to the passage of Section 580, California Code of Civil
Procedure, which limited the judgment to the difference between the value of
the property at the time of the sale and the unpaid balance of the obligation.
Because this section was not applied, the mortgagor appealed from the judgment.
Previous cases'12 had been decided on the basis that the section could not be given
effect because of the constitutional provisions against impairment of contracts.
The court remarked that the question mark placed after this conclusion by
Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.'3 had been
underscored by the Gelfert decision. The court held, however, that the statute
was not retroactive, regardless of the Gelfert case, not because such an effect
would be unconstitutional but because it was not the Legislature's intention to
make it retroactive.' 4 For the same reason a New Jersey court, in Henderson v.
Weber,'5 refused to apply retroactively a statute which replaced an earlier retro-
active one after the earlier one had been declared unconstitutional.' 6 But although
New Jersey has taken this view of its statute in its law courts,, it grants to equity
without the aid of a statute the jurisdiction to review deficiency judgments in
the light of the market value of the property. In Fidelity Union Trust Co. v.
Multiple Realty & Construction Co.,1 7 such jurisdiction is held to be inherent in
courts of equity. The mortgaged premises having been purchased by the mortgagee
9. 343 Pa. 428, 22 A. (2d) 896 (1941).
10. In Beaver County, B. & L. Ass'n v. Winowich, 323 Pa. 483, 187 AtI. 481 (1936).
11. 63 Cal. App. (2d) 817, 148 P. (2d) 410 (1944).
12. Birkhofer v. Krumm, 27 Cal. App. (2d) 513, 81 FI. (2d) 609 (1938) and cases
cited therein.
13. 300 U. S. 124 (1937).
14. It contained no expression of an intent to operate on existing rights, and statutes
are construed prospectively in the absence of clear expression to the contrary. Sheil-
chawt v. Moffett, 294 N. Y. 180, 61 N. E. (2d) 435 (1945); Jones v. Union Oil Co.,
218 Cal. 775, 777, 25 P. (2d) 5, 6 (1933). As other sections added at the same time
specifically mentioned existing obligations and this one did not, the court, reasonably
enough, inferred no intent to include them.
15. 131 N. J. L. 299, 35 A. (2d) 609 (1944). It is interesting to note that the
defendant in this case claimed that the repeal of the earlier statute was unconstitutional
as depriving him of a vested right, namely, the right to have the fair market value
of the property credited against the deficiency judgment. The court held that there is
no vested right in any particular remedy, a reply which sauced the mortgagor's goose
as well as it has the mortgagee's gander in other cases. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v.
Multiple Realty & Construction Co., 131 N. J. Eq. 527, 26 A. (2d) 155 (1942).
16. Vanderbilt v. Brunton Piano Co., 111 N. J. L. 596, 169 AtI. 177 (1933); Alert
Building & Loan Ass'n v. Bechtold, 120 N. J. L. 397, 199 AtI. 734 (1938).
17. 131 N. J. Eq. 527, 26 A. (2d) 155 (1942).
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for a nominal sum at the foreclosure sale, the mortgagor was allowed to set up
his right to a credit for the fair market value. "All the complainant can ask,"
said the court,' 8 "is that his debt shall be paid," thus following the reasoning of
the Gelfert case.
It is submitted that the majority in the instant case has adequate precedent
for adhering to the Supreme Court's view-a precedent derived not only from
deficiency judgment cases but one deeply grounded in the policies of our courts.1 9
The weight of authority holds that the remedy for enforcing the obligation of a
contract may be modified by statute without impairing the obligation. 20 If a
sufficient method is left or provided, a legislative change, enlargement or curtail-
ment of the existing method of enforcement will not be considered an impairment
of a contract. 21 But the vigorous dissent indicates that the settled nature of the
procedure has encrusted the shell of remedy so firmly over the body of the right
it is intended to protect as to make them difficult to distinguish. The purpose
of statutes limiting deficiency judgments is the protection of unfortunate mort-
gagors by relieving them from excessive judgments based on the inadequate fore-
closure sales prices which necessarily prevail in periods of depression in the real
estate market.22 The minority argued that the statute diminished existing con-
tractual relations and imposed on the mortgagee the burden of defending the
status of his judgment, and that such a change in the remedy which existed
when the contract was made is unconstitutional.23 It might well be argued in
reply that failure to change a remedy may increase existing obligations far beyond
any conception of the parties at the time of the contract.
In strict theory, it is unconscionable for a mortgagee to collect more than
once any portion of the debt owing to him. This he does whenever he buys in
the mortgaged property for less than its fair value, if he is entitled to an auto-
matic deficiency judgment for the difference between his purchase price at the
foreclosure sale and the debt. In both the Gelfert case and the instant case the
mortgagee was the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, and in both cases the decision
was restricted to a transaction in which that circumstance was present. Courts
of equity have long had the authority to render deficiency judgments after fore-
closure sales, whether or not there is an express statutory provision.24 When the
inadequacy of the sale price was so gross as to shock the conscience or if, "there
be additional circumstances against its fairness", 25 a sale may be set aside. There
is no doubt that the Supreme Court, in using the words just quoted, was not
considering the problem posed in the instant case, but the sense of the quotation
need not be unduly stretched to make it apply. The unfair circumstance lies in
giving the mortgagee more, in money's worth, than the amount of his claim, at
the expense of the mortgagor. "The judgment holder," says the minority, "must
18. Id. at p. 162.
19. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. State, 188 Ind. 173, 122 N. E. 584 (1919); City of
Portland v. Thornton, 174 Ore. 509, 149 P. (2d) 972 (1944).
20. 1 CooLEY, CoNsTuIToTNAL LMITATioNs (8th ed. 1927) 587.
21. Lowther v. Peoples Bank, 293 Ky. 425, 169 S. W. (2d) 35 (1943).
22. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Gotham Silk Hosiery Co., 179 Misc. 557, 39
N. Y. S. (2d) 310 .(1943); Langever v. Miller, 124 Tex. 80, 76 S. W. (2d) 1025 (1934).
23. McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 607 (1844).
24. 2 WnTsma, TREATSE o N MORTGAE FoRxcrosuRE (4th ed. 1927) § 957.
25. Ballentyne v. Smith, 205 U. S. 285 (1907).
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. . . suffer the risk of a further diminution of his judgment if the Court is later
of the opinion that the land sold for less than its reasonable market value, or
lose his judgment altogether." 26 No doubt, there may be a diminution of his
eventual judgment, but only to the extent that the previously existing remedy
would have given excessive relief.
The minority asserted a "general unanimity of view among state courts" prior
to the Gelfert case. Th.t unanimity, however, was upset in Michigan27 when
the court, shortly before the Gelfert decision, unanimously upheld the constitution-
ality of a statute along .the lines of the one considered in the instant case. Adams-
v. Spillyards28 is one of the cases cited in asserting this unanimity. It appears,
however, to be distinguishable from the instant case. In it, the court held un-
constitutional a statute under which the lower court had refused to enter a fore-
closure decree unless the mortgagee would stipulate to bid, at the sale, the amount
of the judgment plus interest and costs. To provide, as did this statute, that the
value of the real estate must be considered to be equal to the amount of the
mortgage, deprives the mortgagee of the personal responsibility of the mortgagor.
This certainly diminishes existing contractual relations and dispenses with an es-
sential obligation expressed in the contract; it interferes not merely with a remedy
but with a substantial right.29 The opinion in the South Carolina case of Federal
Land Bank v. Garrison,"0 failed to distinguish between a mortgagee purchaser
and a third party purchaser. The statute which the South Carolina court held
unconstitutional provided for an appraisal by which the deficiency judgment was
measured whether or not the mortgagee was the successful bidder. Thus if a
third party bid the property in for less than the appraised value, the mortgagee
would get only the difference between the appraised value and the amount of his
claim. He would receive no equivalent for the difference between the sale price
and the appraised value. To give the mortgagor credit for fair market value
under such circumstances would be not merely a change in remedy but an im-
pairment of the mortgagee's claim. No such legislation has been held constitutional
and no decisions have favored the mortgagor where there is a third party purchaser-
Under certain circumstances the threat of a lowering of the deficiency judgment
to allow for the fair value of the property may work to the disadvantage of the
mortgagor whom the laws in question are designed to protect. Mortgagees may
tend to avoid bidding at foreclosure sales if the courts were to reduce their
deficiency judgments with what the mortgagees considered unreasonable frequency,
or to an unreasonable degree. Withdrawal of the mortgagee from foreclosure
sale bidding would deprive the proceedings of a bidder whom the mortgagor could
ill afford to lose in times of poor real estate markets. The mortgagor appears to
have no protection against an inadequate bid by a third party, provided only
that the bid is not unconscionably low or fraudulent.
26. Id. at p. 988.
27. Guardian Depositor's Corp. v. Powers, 296 Mfich. 553, 296 N. W. 675 (1941).
28. 187 Ark. 641, 61 S. W. (2d) 686 (1933).
29. " . . if the mortgagee is unwilling to file the stipulation required by section 2,
he can never have a decree of foreclosure and sale and can never realize anything from
the security under foreclosure in court." Id. at p. 689.
30. 185 S. C. 255, 193 S. E. 308 (1937).
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-NEGLIGENCE IN MAINTENANCE OF FIRE-FIGHTING
EQUIPmENT-EFFECT oF WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY.-Fire which broke out
on adjoining premises destroyed plaintiff's property. Plaintiff seeks to recover
$27,900 damages from City of Beacon, alleging the destruction of his property
was caused by the negligence of the city in failing to keep in repair a pressure
and flow regulating valve in the city's water lines and in negligently operating a
manually operated valve, and that by reason of such negligence an insufficient
quantity of water was provided to combat effectively the fire. Liability was predi-
cated upon the provisions of the city charter authorizing the city to construct and
operate a water works system and requiring it to maintain a fire department. The
trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint for failure to state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. Upon appeal, held, judgment affirmed, two judges
dissenting. Steitz et al. v. City of Beacon, 295 N. Y. 51, 64 N. E. (2d) 704 (1945).
The majority of the court deny remedy to the property owner on the ground
that as an individual he possesses no right to protection by the defendant munici-
pality from fire. The result reached is the same as when a remedy was denied
purely on the theory that fire protection was a governmental function of the mu-
nicipal corporation which was, therefore, protected from suit by extension to the
city of the state's sovereign immunity from suit.1 Such functions of the city, as
were considered to have for their primary purpose the welfare and protection of
the community as a whole, have been uniformly throughout the United States
designated "governmental" and were immune from suit on the settled principle
of the common law that an individual could not maintain an action against a
political subdivision of the state for injury resulting from negligence in the per-
formance of any governmental function. 2 The protection extended to governmental
functions rests upon an adoption of the English theory that "the King can do
no wrong",3 although later cases advance as a reason public policy which would
avoid the diversion of public funds to satisfaction of private claims.4 The de-
partments of the government almost invariably considered governmental are those
established for fire and police protection, health and public charities.5 As to other
activities of the state, there has been increasing diversity of opinion in different
1. None of the civil divisions of the state-its counties, cities, towns, and villages-
has any independent sovereignty. See N. Y. CONsT. Art. IX, § 9; City of Chicago v.
Sturges, 222 U. S. 313, 323 (1911). The legal irresponsibility heretofore enjoyed by
these governmental units was nothing more than an extension of the exemption from
liability which the state possessed. Murtha v. N. Y. H. M. Col. & Flower Hospital,
228 N. Y. 183, 185, 126 N. E. 722 (1920).
2. Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T. R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K. B. 1788).
3. Professor Borchard points out that this maxim merely meant that the king was
not privileged to do wrong and if his acts were against the law, they were wrongs,
but that the maxim was misunderstood, even by Blackstone and Coke, and introduced
without sufficient understanding into this country, surviving mainly by reason of its
antiquity. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1924) 34 YALue L. J. 1.
4. Taylor v. Westerfield, 233 Ky. 619, 26 S. W. (2d) 557 (1930). Justice Holmes
advanced the theory that "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can
be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends." Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349, 353 (1907).
5. Augustine v. Town of Brant, 249 N. Y. 198, 204, 163 N. E. 732, 734 (1928).
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jurisdictions.0 Dissatisfaction with the rule of governmental immunity engendered
by the obvious injustice resulting in many situations from its application impels
the courts to make a distinction between governmental and proprietary functions
of the municipal corporation and to hold the city liable for torts in connection.
with the latter. The line between the two kinds of functions is wavering and
indistinct.7 New York has consistently tended to narrow the range of municipal
immunity by denominating more and more activities as merely proprietary. In
New York today the state and its sub-divisions are liable for torts in connection
with public parks and playgrounds; 8 for torts in connection with sewers and drains,
9
streets and highways, 10 and, more recently, in connection with the maintenance
of educational buildings. 11
Despite the modem tendency to restrict rather than to extend the doctrine of
municipal immunity,' 2 and the tentative suggestion that the distinction be entirely
abolished,13 neither New York, nor any other state, has yet taken the revolu-
tionary step of declaring either police or fire departments to be other than purely
governmental functions of the state.1 4 New York has, however, attempted to
6. The numerous conflicting cases are collected in the annotation in 120 A. L. R.
1376 (1939).
7. Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182, 191 (1923). "It has been long recognized
that the distinction between governmental and corporate powers and functions is an
illusory one, incapable of uniform application, and productive of the most unsatisfactory
results." HARPER, TORTS (1933) 663.
8. Ehrgott v. Mayor of City of New York, 96 N. Y. 264 (1884); Van Dyke v,
City of Utica, 203 App. Div. 26, 196 N. Y. Supp. 277 (4th Dep't 1922) and cases cited
therein.
9. Mayor v. Furze, 3 Hill 612 (N. Y. 1842); Seifert v. City of Brooklyn, 101 N. Y.
136, 4 N. E. 321 (1886); Byrnes v. City of Cohoes, 67 N. Y. 204 (1876).
10. Conrad v. Village of Ithaca, 16 N. Y. 158 (1857) and Weet v. Trustees of Village
of Brockport which in effect is incorporated into the court's opinion in the Conrad
case-see reporter's note at page 161 of 16 N. Y.
11. Wahrmann v. Board of Education, 187 N. Y. 331, 80 N. E. 192 (1907). Contra:
Hill v. Boston, 22 Mass. 344 (1877). The holding in Hill v. Boston represents the ma-
jority view. 4 DILLON, Mulicis'C CORPOaxRAONS (5th ed. 1911) 2888.
12. Augustine v. Town of Brant, 249 N. Y. 198, 205, 163 N. E. 732, 734 (1928);
Matter of Evans v. Berry, 262 N. Y. 61, 70, 186 N. E. 203, 206 (1933).
13. The well-known case of Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158, 126 N. E.
72 (1919) attempted to break away from the injustice resulting from the rule of gov-
ernmental immunity by permitting a plaintiff to recover for death of deceased caused
by fire truck returning from a fire, on the ground that a merely proprietary function
was involved. Wanamaker, J. in a concurring opinion, disagreeing with the theory of
proprietary function, held the activity to be governmental and argued against the im-
munity of the city in the exercise of governmental functions. Fowler v. City of Cleveland,
however, was soon overruled. Aldrich v. Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N. E.
164 (1922).
14. This is true if we except the State of Florida which in Kaufman v. Tallahassee,
84 Fla. 634, 94 So. 697 (1922), aff'd. 87 Fla. 119, 100 So. 150 (1924), held that the
adoption by a city of the commission form of government rendered it immaterial
whether the city was acting in a governmental or proprietary capacity as it was liable
for tort to the same extent as any quasi-public corporation whose activities partook more
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remedy the injustice, resulting from the individual's former inability to sue for
tort of any kind committed by these governmental departments or their employees
or agents, by enacting Section 8 of the Court of Claims Act,' 5 which reads: "The
state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby assumes
liability and consents to have the same determined in accordance with the same
rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme court against individuals or
corporations."1 6 The effect of Section 8 in the instant case is to render it im-
material whether the defendant is an individual or a municipal corporation in
determining whether the plaintiff can recover. However, if, as the majority hold,
there exists no duty on the part of the defendant municipality to the plaintiff,
there can be no recovery. The precise question involved therefore is not, as might
appear at first reading, whether immunity should be granted, 17 but whether the
city owes any duty to the plaintiff herein. In the absence of agreement between
the parties or of express statutory imposition of such duty, the question becomes
one of legislative intent in framing the City of Beacon's charter which authorized
the city to construct and operate a system of waterworks and which provided
that the city shall maintain a fire department.' 8
The majority of the court construe the charter as imposing a duty only to the
general public and deny a cause of action to the individual plaintiff because they
did not believe the legislature intended to impose a duty in respect of each indi-
vidual property owner. In interpreting legislative intention conflict arises between
the deeply settled conviction that only by the most specific language will the
legislature be deemed to have imposed upon the state liability in tort,19 and the
more liberal view championed by Justice Holmes, when he said: "The Legislature
has the power to decide what the policy of the law shall be, and if it has intimated
its will, however indirectly, that will should be recognized and obeyed. The major
premise of the conclusion expressed in a statute, the change of policy that induces
the enactment, may not be set out in terms, but it is not an adequate discharge
of the nature of a business than a government. South Carolina has gone to the other
extreme, and has held all activity of the government to be governmental. Irvine v.
Town of Greenwood, 89 S. C. 511, 72 S. E. 228 (1911).
15. N. Y. CoURT oF CIAnms Acr § 8.
16. Previously, a step had been taken in this direction in the enactment of § 264 of
the Code of Civil Procedure by which the Court of Claims was given jurisdiction to
hear and determine private claims against the state and the state consented in all such
claims to have its liability determined. However, the Court of Appeals in, Smith v.
State of New York, 227 N. Y. 405, 409, 124 N. E. 841, 842 (1920) held that by
waiving its immunity from action, the state did not concede its liability. The correction
of this deficiency by the enactment of § 8 was recognized in Jackson v. State of New
York, 261 N. Y. 134, 138, 184 N. E. 735, 736 (1933), which announced the doctrine
that by assuming liability and creating a remedy to enforce it, the sovereign was not
dispensing charity, but rather recognizing and acknowledging a moral duty demanded
by the principles of justice.
17. One of the grounds upon which the trial court dismissed the complaint was that
the exercise of the power to furnish fire protection by a municipality is a governmental
function for which no civil liability may be imposed. Steitz v. Beacon, 268 App. Div.
1008, 52 N. Y. S. (2d) 788 (2d Dep't 1945).
18. N. Y. Laws 1913, c. 539, § 24, as amended by N. Y. LAws 1920, c. 171, § 6.
19. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1924) 34 YALE L. J. 1, 11.
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of duty for courts to say: We see what you are driving at, but you have not
said it, and therefore we shall go on as before." 20 To aid us in determining what
kind of duty-whether private as well as public-is embodied in the legislature's
grant of the city of Beacon's charter, it may be helpful to examine analagous cases.
The court would appear to base its decision on the authority of Mock Co. v.
Rensselaer Water Co.,21 when it states: "The Mock case is controlling here because
it has judicially determined that a corporation under a positive statutory duty to
furnish water for the extinguishment of fires is not rendered liable for damages
caused by a fire started by another because of a breach of this statutory duty."
22
However, the defendant in the Mock case was a public service corporation which,
in accordance with its obligations under the provisions of the Transportations Cor-
porations Law23 to furnish water at reasonable rates upon demand by the city
for the extinguishment of fires, contracted with the city to deliver water to fire
hydrants. In holding the defendant not liable for damage to propeity caused by
inadequate water supply, the court stressed that the duty of the defendant cor-
poration was to the city,24 and, as the dissent in the instant case points out, the
City of Rensselaer was under no legal duty to supply its inhabitants with pro-
tection against fire.
25
The dissenting opinion in the subject case attempts to predicate liability on the
part of the city on the authority of the recent case of Bernardine v. City of New
York26 in which it was held that the City of New York would be liable for negli-
gence in connection with the conduct of its police department, in consequence
of the state's waiver of immunity. Judge Desmond, writing the dissenting opinion
in the instant case, states: "The common law theory of nonliability of municipal
corporations in connection with their police departments was precisely the same
as with respect to their fire departments. We conclude that the cities of this
state have, as a result of the state's waiver of its immunity, become liable at
least for negligent maintenance of such facilities and appliances for fire protection
as they possess.'" 2T This conclusion does not necessarily follow, however, as -the
Bernardine case involved an action for personal injuries caused to the plaintiff by
a runaway police horse. A decision to the effect that since the enactment of
Section 8, a city is liable for acts of misfeasance in the exercise of a govern-
mental function is not controlling authority for holding the city liable for mere
nonfeasance. This distinction is accepted and cited in Murrain v. Wilson Line,
20. Johnson v. United States, 163 Fed. 30, 32 (C. C. A. 1st, 1908).
21. 247 N. Y. 160, 159 N. E. 896 (1928).
22. Id. at 57, 159 N. E. at 899.
23. N. Y. TRAxs. CoRp. LAw § 42.
24. "The weight of authority is that the contracting company is not chargeable with
any greater liability than the city itself; that the contract is between the city and the
water company only." 3 DirIoN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 2303; 2 RESTATEmENT, TORTS
(1934) § 288.
25. 295 N. Y. 51, 64 N. E. (2d) 704 (1945). See also, Springfield Fire Ins. Co. v.
Village of Keesvle,, 148 N. Y. 46, 42 N. E. 405 (1895).
26. 294 N. Y. 361, 62 N. E. (2d) 604 (1945).
27. 295 N. Y. 51, 59, 64 N. E. (2d) 704, 708 (1945). It is to be noted that the
minority opinion restricted its position to negligent maintenance and did not decide
what liability, if any, there would be if the alleged fault of the city was a failure to
provide adequate fire-fighting facilities or to use them efficiently.
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Inc.,2 8 decided after the principal case, where it is observed, on the authority of
Bernardine v. City of N. Y., that a municipality is answerable at least for its
negligence of commission in exercising a governmental function but not for its
failure to exercise a governmental function, such as to provide police or fire
protection.
More difficult to distinguish is another recent case, Foley v. State of New York, 29
where the court sustained a cause of action in favor of individuals injured in a
collision between two automobiles resulting from the negligence of agents of the
state in failing to replace a burned-out traffic light bulb. The Court of Appeals
did not attempt to classify the maintenance of a traffic control system as other
than a governmental function but based its decision on the right under Section 8
of an individual to sue the state for negligence in the performance of its duty
to him. It conceded in effect that where a statute has imposed a duty upon the
state, the state can be effectively sued for breach of that duty. The state's argu-
ment was that it had assumed no liability for damage resulting from negligence
involved in its maintenance of traffic lights. However, the court found for the
plaintiff because it found such liability implied in the statute requiring the main-
tenance of the lights. The majority opinion in the instant case reiterated that
the duty imposed by the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law,20 and neglected in
the Foley case, was imposed for the sole purpose of protecting from collision
damage individuals using the highway and that violation of such duty, resulting
in damage, gave rise to an action in tort since the purpose of the statutory enact-
ment was to protect the individual traveler and not just the public at large. The
majority of the court in the instant case distinguished Foley v. State on that
very ground. It is true that the language of the Vehicle and Traffic Law spe-
cifically imposes a duty of maintenance at state expense, while the language of
the charter of the City of Beacon may be deemed, as the majority held, to con-
note "nothing more than creation of departments of municipal government, the
grant of essential powers of government, and directions as to their exercise."'' a
In other words, the majority refused to read into the charter provisions, the
establishment of a legal duty on the part of the city to maintain fire fighting
facilities for the benefit of any particular individual. Aside from the express lan-
guage of the two enactments, is there any basis for this distinction? One possible
line that might be drawn between the two situations is that in the case of the
establishment of a system of traffic lights the city not only encourages, but re-
quires, the citizens' use thereof. The city does not, in relation to the individual,
put its hydrants where they must be used, nor does it create the situation in
which the plaintiff finds himself. It does not volunteer to regulate his conduct,
as it does when it undertakes to lay sidewalks for his use,32 and as it even more
28. - App. Div. -, 59 N. Y. S. (2d) 750 (1st Dep't 1946).
29. 294 N. Y. 275, 62 N. E. (2d) 69 (1945).
30. N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRamic LAw § 95-a which reads: "The state traffic commission
shall have the power and it shall be its duty to regulate the type, location, erection,
maintenance and removal of all traffic control signals and signal lights on or along any
state highway maintained by the state and every such signal or light shall hereafter be
maintained at the expense of the state."
31. 295 N. Y. 51, 55, 64 N. E. (2d) 704, 706 (1946).
32. "He was obliged to proceed upon a public highway if he were to proceed at all."
Osipoff v. City of New York, 260 App. Div. 653, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 481 (2nd Dep't 1940),
rev'd 286 N. Y. 422, 36 N. E. (2d) 646 (1941).
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surely does when it establishes traffic lights to which it requires obedience. In
the establishment of fire fighting facilities, the city places no duty on the property
owner to summon city-supplied fire fighting equipment or to make use of city-
supplied hydrants. The property owner is entitled to extinguish a fire with what-
ever means he may have at hand. When the fire department responds to a fire,
it is not in fulfillment of any duty it owes to the individual property owner to
put out his fire but it is in response to a public duty to protect the community
at large from the danger of fire and conflagration. The municipality's assistance
to individual property owners may be deemed a mere gratuity. It might be that,
if the city interfered with an individual's fire fighting attempts and compelled him
to abandon his efforts when the firemen took charge, the city would then have
assumed liability for negligent conduct in fighting the fire. In the absence of
such assumption of protection to the exclusion of the individual's own efforts, no
implied duty other than a general or public duty should be inferred.
Murrain v. Wilson Line, InC.3s applies the holding of the principal case to a
municipality's failure to furnish adequate police protection. The Murrain case in-
volved an action for death and personal injuries resulting from a jam at the gates
of a city-owned pier caused by the refusal of lodge committeemen in charge of
an outing to open the gates. The plaintiffs contended that police officers, two of
whom had been in attendance and ten of whom had been called in when the danger
became apparent, did not act with the dispatch or in the manner required by the
occasion to control the crowd and that the accident resulted from their failure
to give proper attention and action to the situation. By a closely divided court,
it was held that, since the police protection afforded for the occasion was not in
the nature of individual care of private patrons, the pier being nothing more
than an extension of the public street, all that could be expected -from the city
under the circumstances was police protection of the same nature and degree as
would be afforded to any public gathering at any public place.34
With the disappearance in New York of the necessity of drawing a distinction
between the governmental and proprietary functions of a municipality, as a result
of the express waiver of immunity from liability for torts committed by a mu-
nicipality in the former capacity, the important problem in ensuing cases will in-
volve the basic question common to all negligence cases, i.e., did the defendant
owe the plaintiff any legal duty in the premises? Little difficulty will be encoun-
tered where the harm is caused by an act of misfeasance by a municipal employee
acting within the scope of his employment, for all persons (whether public or
private) owe the duty to refrain from actively injuring another.35 The more dif-
ficult cases will deal with instances of mere nonfeasance. Whether the omission
to act will constitute actionable negligence in favor of the individual plaintiff will
to a great extent depend not only upon the type of action omitted but also upon
33. - App. Div. -, 59 N. Y. S. (2d) 750 (lst Dep't 1946).
34. "The nature of the duty and the benefits to be accomplished through its per-
formance must generally determine whether it is a duty to the public in part or ex-
clusively, or whether individuals may claim that it is a duty imposed wholly or in part
for their especial benefit." Cooley, J. in Taylor v. L. S. & M. S. R. Co., 45 Mich. 74,
7 N. W. 728 (1881).
35. Osipoff v. City of New York, 260 App. Div. 653, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 481 (2d dept.
1940) rev'd 286 N. Y. 422, 36 N. E. (2d) 646 (1941). See (1944) 13 FoRD A LAW
REv. 252.
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